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The Soviet response to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
during the period March 1983 through November 1 985 provided indications
of their view of the program both as a threat and as an opportunity to
weaken NATO. The SDI is seen not only as a threat to the physical
security of the Soviet Union but as part of an effort by the United
States to seize the strategic initiative by neutralizing the military
component of Soviet strategy. A major objective of that strategy is
the political separation of Western Europe from the United States which
the Soviets sought to facilitate by aggravating allied concern over the
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was announced by President
Reagan in March 1983 with virtually no public (and minimal official)
debate concerning its implications for United States policy in terms of
the possible reactions of the NATO allies and the Soviet Union to the
program. Since then, a great deal of debate has been generated on both
sides of the Atlantic centering on the SDI's technical feasibility and
strategic desirability. At the hub of the controversy is the Soviet
Union for it is here that the other aspects of the debate largely
hinge.
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the factors that have
conditioned the Soviet response by examining the SDI in the context of
the US and Soviet views of their opponent's political-military
strategy. Consideration of US strategic motives from the Soviet
perspective enables a fuller understanding of the actual Soviet
perception of the SDI. Such an understanding is necessary to support
American political objectives for the program as well as for countering
Soviet efforts to deny their achievement.
The Reagan Administration's apparent motives for launching the SDI
are presented in Part II. The threat rationale for the SDI involves
its role in countering trends in Soviet strategic force posture. The
Administration has argued that the SDI is intended to restore
equilibrium in Soviet-American strategic capabilities as a necessary
pre-condition for large-scale reductions in offensive nuclear forces.
The arms control rationale for the SDI lies in its potential for
providing the Soviets with an incentive for cooperating with the United
States in achieving the offensive force reductions sought by the
Administration
.
Part III considers the SDI in the context of strategic deception.
The Administration's persuasive and compellant objectives for the SDI
are identified and distinguished from the potentially deceptive objec-
tives as they might be viewed by the Soviets. It is hypothesized that
the Soviet predisposition to see deception behind the SDI is reinforced
by their assessment of US intentions and capabilities and the utility
of military deception in furthering the achievement of political goals.
Using the concept of "transparent cover" as a model, it is further
argued that that the SDI as deception is theoretically possible.
Therefore, Soviet claims of deception in their response to the SDI
should not be dismissed as mere propaganda.
Part IV examines the Soviet response from the SDI's announcement in
March 1 983 to the Geneva summit in November 1985. Commentary drawn
from Soviet open sources was analyzed in order to distinguish the
actual Soviet perception of the SDI from the purely propaganda element
in their public statements and positions.
It was anticipated that the Soviet response would contain both
defensive and offensive characteristics. The defensive aspect derived
from their view of the SDI as part of a US effort to seize the
strategic initiative by neutralizing the military component of Soviet
strategy. The Soviets therefore rejected the Administration's
defensive and arms control rationales for the program. In their
discussion of the SDI as a threat the Soviets also provided direct and
indirect indications of their view of the SDI as an attempt at
deception
.
In order to gain support for the SDI, the Administration has tried
to persuade the NATO allies that the program would insure the main-
tenance of European security. The offensive aspect of the Soviet
response consisted of efforts to reinforce European misgivings on stra-
tegic defense thereby undermining allied support for the program. The
SDI was thus seen by the Soviets as another opportunity to exploit
existing divergences of interest between the United States and NATO
Europe .
II. APPARENT MOTIVES FOR THE SDI
The Administration's case for the SDI is grounded in two arguments.
First, the SDI is considered a necessary response to the Soviet
military threat. Developments in Soviet offensive and defensive forces
are seen as consistent with a global strategy that calls for military
superiority across the board. The SDI has been offered as one element
of a US defense program that will restore and maintain the balance
between Soviet and American strategic forces. Second, it is argued
that the SDI will help to restore some measure of efficacy to the arms
control process. The prevailing opinion within the Administration
seems to be that, given the nature of Soviet strategic objectives, arms
control as it has been conducted in the past has not been to the net
benefit of the United States. The SDI has been recommended as an
incentive for the Soviets to engage in serious negotiations that will
ultimately result in large-scale reductions in offensive forces.
A. THE THREAT RATIONALE
The Department of Defense has identified three developments in
Soviet military capabilities that pose major challenges for US defense
policy:
- The Soviet military buildup, both qualitative and quantitative, has
produced a major shift in the nuclear and conventional balance;
- The Soviet military offensive capability has increased
dramatically; and
- The Soviets have significantly extended the global reach of their
military forces, enhancing the ability to project influence and
power, especially in the Third World [Ref. 1:p. 133].
These and other statements by Administration officials reflect an
image of the Soviet Union characterized by the latter' s long-term
global policy of (1) revisionism with respect to the strategic balance
of power; (2) obsession with achieving strategic superiority which
facilitates (3) expansion into the Third World. Underlying all of
these themes is a perception of the demonstrated and potential
political utility of the Soviet military in peacetime in a manner
harmful to US global interests.
A fundamental assumption in the Administration's view of the Soviet
strategic program is the latter's rejection of the concept of mutual
assured destruction (MAD). Simply put, MAD assumes that both the US
and USSR retain sufficient non-vulnerable kill capacity to guarantee
destruction of an attacker even after the absorption of a first strike
[Ref. 2:p. xii]. Since the mid-1960s, US declaratory (public)
doctrine has been to favor programs that enhance an "assured
destruction" capability. The United States had apparently concluded
that against a determined and powerful opponent like the Soviet Union,
a major effort to achieve clear-cut superiority would be unavailing, at
best needlessly expensive, and at worst dangerously provocative and
destabilizing [Ref. 3:p. 84]. In other words, given the enormous
destructive power of nuclear weapons, the United States had adhered to
the concept of MAD as the most rational course in limiting the
possibility of nuclear war. The maintenance of MAD, which assumes the
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maintenance of the strategic balance, was deemed worthy of pursuing
because it has worked and there are no practical alternatives.
The dictates of their strategic culture cause the Soviets to take
quite a different view of the MAD concept. According to
Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the Soviet Union is compelled to act as an
instrument of the forces of history which will ultimately result in the
worldwide victory of socialism. Therefore, the Soviets must challenge
the status quo in all areas where progress toward the ultimate goal
might be inhibited. Since the MAD concept reinforces the strategic
status quo, it inherently contradicts Marxist-Leninist doctrine and its
acceptance by the Soviets could be interpreted as abandonment of the
world socialist mission. The strategic corollary of the Soviet
ideological position would consider permanent parity with the United
States as equivalent to permanent defeat. The Soviets have thus found
it expedient to abide by the tenets of MAD not as a normative concept
but rather as an objective, and temporary, fact. Similarly, strategic
nuclear parity with the United States is not considered by the Soviets
to be necessarily permanent.
The Administration's perception of the Soviet Union's revisionist
orientation is reinforced by the nature and extent of the latter's
strategic doctrine and weapons programs. Over the years, the
declaratory doctrine espoused by the party leadership has consistently
denied any intention of seeking military superiority. Yet Soviet
military literature has shown similar continuity in basic attitudes
toward nuclear war and policies to prepare for it. Central to Soviet
attitudes is their focus on fighting nuclear war and the attending
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requirement for various forms of superiority, even if only marginal
[Ref. 3:p. 84]. In the view of the Department of Defense:
"This dangerous shift in the global balance unmistakenly demonstrated
Soviet intentions to attain a position of military superiority.
Should this trend continue unchecked, one must assume
—
given Soviet
writings, force deployments, and strategic exercises— the Soviet
leadership could conclude that they had acquired the capability to
fight and win a nuclear war." [Ref. 1:p. 134]
Another major development of concern to the Reagan Administration
is the Soviet acquisition of a power projection capability. This
capability and the issue of the strategic balance are directly related.
The attainment of strategic parity with the United States in the early
1970s was interpreted by the Soviets as their having achieved global
status. Such a view was tacitly reinforced by the United States in the
SALT I agreement. However, the latter did not foresee the effect that
recognition of the Soviet Union as an equal strategic power would have
on the its opponent's global policy, i.e., that such recognition would
be received as conferring upon the USSR the status of an overall equal
to the United States including the right to pursue an activist policy
in the Third World [Ref. 4:p. 2].
By the mid-1970s, as Soviet doctrinal literature increasingly
emphasized the need to be able to act and react in areas distant from
the homeland, Soviet military developments, particularly the growth in
naval and airlift assets, indicated that the Soviet Union was rapidly
acquiring a capability commensurate with its perceived global status
[Ref. 2:p. xiii]. Increased Soviet activism in the Third World is at
least partially attributable to the confidence provided by strategic
12
offensive and defensive forces that had also been undergoing continuous
modernization and expansion.
1 . Soviet Offensive Programs
The Reagan Administration is concerned over what it perceives
as "worrisome" trends in the strategic balance brought about by
increased Soviet deployments of multi-warhead land missiles. The
Soviet Union, like the United States, possesses a strategic "triad" of
land-based, submarine-launched, and airborne nuclear forces capable of
intercontinental attack. But it is the combination of quantitative
increases and qualitative improvements in the land-based component of
the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal that the Administration finds most
threatening [Ref. 5].
The Soviet Strategic Rocket Force consists of some 1,400 silo
launchers compared to about 1,026 for the United States as of mid-1985.
Beginning in the mid-1070s, however, the growth in the number of Soviet
ICBM reentry vehicles has been rapid due to the deployment of SS-17,
SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs. These fourth generation systems carry more and
larger multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) than
the most modern US ICBM, the MINUTEMAN III. The number of Soviet ICBM
reentry vehicles is currently assessed at about 6,300 versus roughly
2,100 for the United States. The newer Soviet systems, moreover, are
believed to be considerably more accurate and, through silo hardening,
more survivable than the predecessor systems. [Ref. 1:p. 29]
Concern within the Administration is further aggravated by
evident Soviet plans to deploy two new ICBMs, the medium-size SS-X-24
and the smaller SS-25 . Under the rules of the SALT II Treaty, which
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both powers are observing even though it was not ratified by the
Senate, the US and USSR are allowed to deploy one new missile each.
The Soviets have claimed the SS-X-24 as their entry while the United
States has chosen the MX (Missile-Experimental), or PEACEKEEPER. The
Soviets insist that the SS-25 is merely an updated version of the
obsolescent SS-13 and so does not qualify as a new weapon or as a SALT
violation. The Administration continues to dispute both points. In
any case, the potential mobility of both the SS-X-24 (mounted on a
disguisable train launcher) and the SS-25 (transported and launched
from flatbed trucks) will make the task of locating and engaging these
weapons in a counterforce strike much more difficult if not impossible.
[Ref. 6]
The perceived quantitative imbalance between US and Soviet
land-based nuclear forces combined with improvements in Soviet ICBM
capability and survivability are seen as enhancing the latter's
potential for the destruction of US nuclear forces either through a
limited preemptive attack or through a massive first strike. According
to Secretary of Defense Weinberger, a fraction of the Soviet
first-strike force—itself representing only a portion of the Soviet
ICBM force—has the capability of destroying most of the US land-based
missiles, submarines in port, and bombers on airfields thereby
neutralizing the American retaliatory capacity [Ref. 7:p. 33- The
Administration contends that a future president, left with only
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) of insufficient accuracy
to destroy anything but Soviet cities, is not a credible retaliatory
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threat. Such an attack would probably only result in a Soviet attack
on US population centers [Ref. 8],
The Reagan Administration has thus felt compelled to take
steps to restore the strategic balance and, in the process, revitalize
the deterrent posture of the United States. One aspect of the US
response is the Strategic Modernization Program begun in October 1981
which aims to redress perceived deficiencies in the US strategic triad,
for example, through the deployment of the PEACEKEEPER (MX) ICBM, and
the TRIDENT II SLBM both of which have the capability of penetrating
hardened targets. [Ref. 1:p. 135]
A second potential US response is the Strategic Defense
Initiative announced in March 1 983 • The impact that SDI deployment
would have on their strategic posture is not lost on the Soviets. The
SDI, which is intended to engage nuclear delivery systems and warheads
after launch could, in effect, negate whatever advances the Soviets
have made in improving the survivability of their fourth and fifth
generation ICBMs either through silo hardening or mobile platforms.
Even if the President's ultimate goal of making nuclear weapons
"impotent and obsolete" is not realized, other Administration officials
have pointed out that the uncertainty introduced to the Soviet decision
making process by even an imperfect US defense could enhance deterrence
by reducing a potential attacker's expectation of success [Ref. 9:p.
3]. It is important to note, however, that the President's stated
objective for the SDI of eliminating nuclear weapons has not been
contradicted by any official in the Reagan Administration even as
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arguments against the technical feasibility of this goal began to
mount
.
2 . Soviet Defensive Programs
Soviet efforts since the end of World War II to provide defense
against attack from aircraft, missiles, and satellites have existed on
a scale considerably beyond any such efforts by the United States [Ref.
10 :p. 159]. This effort has resulted in the most extensive strategic
defense system in the world including thousands of surface-to-air
missile (SAM) systems and interceptor aircraft and the world's only
deployed antiballistic missile (ABM) defense system in the vicinity of
Moscow. Though the current Soviet ABM system is relatively primitive
and rudimentary, the breadth and depth of the Soviet conventional air
defense network and its technical upgrading along with Soviet research
and development in the area of new weapons technology is a source of
increasing concern to the Reagan Administration.
The Soviet Union has long been committed to the doctrine of
"damage limitation" as reflected in the continuing search for a viable
means of ballistic missile defense (BMD). Soviet preoccupation with
war survival is also a manifestation of their unease with MAD as the
best available deterrent and guarantee of peace. A fundamental precept
of MAD holds that mutual vulnerability effected through agreements to
refrain from building nuclear defenses would provide each side with the
unchallenged capacity to destroy the other [Ref. 2:p. 3]. The
realization that complete defense against nuclear attack was not
feasible in any case given the technical means at hand and the imminent
deployment of MIRVed warheads led the US and the USSR in 1972 to
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conclude a treaty limiting the deployment of ABM defenses to one system
for each side. The subsequent abandonment by the US of its ABM system
not only did not result in a reciprocal move by the Soviets (though
such was not necessarily the intent of the US' action) but also did not
inhibit the continued expansion and improvement of Soviet conventional
air defenses nor slowed down their efforts in BMD research and
development. If anything, Soviet activities in these areas intensified
[Ref. 10:p. 159].
Soviet advancements in ABM defense have aggravated the
Administration's concern for the threat to the ICBM and SLBM legs of
the US strategic triad. The Soviets are believed to be in the process
of upgrading the Moscow ABM network with a new interceptor that is much
faster than the original system [Ref. 11]. In addition, two new SAM
systems may have the capability to intercept some types of US ballistic
missiles [Ref. 1:p. 50].
Despite the perceived Soviet lead in deployed ABM systems, it
is generally acknowledged that the USSR lags in technologies such as
computers and software, automated control, telecommunications, and
guidance systems. However, the United States must be concerned not
only with current Soviet activities and near-term developments but also
with indications of Soviet capabilities and intentions as much as
twenty years into the future. Thus, on-going Soviet research in the
area of new-in-principle weapons including directed energy are regarded
as ominous. It is feared that such weapons could be intended for
land-based and spaceborne applications as part of a program for
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comprehensive defense of national territory, i.e., a Soviet version of
the Strategic Defense Initiative [Ref. 12].
According to the Secretary of Defense, the Soviet Union since
the late 1960s has been pursuing a substantial advanced defensive
technologies program that has been exploring many of the same
technologies of interest to the United States in the SDI program [Ref.
7:p. 16]. Significantly, Soviet progress in the research and
development of these technologies is believed to be equal to that of
the United States. In some areas, the Soviets may actually be leading
as, for example, in the case of high-power generators for driving some
types of directed energy weapons [Ref. 1:pp. 44-45]. The Soviets are
also believed to possess an operational anti-satellite (ASAT)
interceptor while the US system is still in the testing phase [Ref.
1 3 : P . 251].
The Soviet investment in their advanced technologies program
combined with indications that they have reached the prototype phase in
some types of weapons have raised Administration fears of a potential
breakout in the deployment of these systems in an ABM role [Ref. 9:p.
3]. According to Department of Defense estimates, the Soviets could be
ready to deploy a ground-based laser for ballistic missile defense by
the early-to-mid-1990s . High-energy lasers for strategic air defense
could be fielded sooner and space-based laser systems for BMD after the
year 2000 [Ref. 1:p. 44].
Key Administration officials, including the President, are con-
vinced that the Soviet Union has embarked upon a program for extending
the defense of their national territory against not only manned
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aircraft but also against the threat from ballistic missiles. As such,
the SDI can be said to be intended not only as a counter to existing
and near-term improvements in Soviet strategic offensive forces. It is
further intended to close a perceived "gap" in Soviet-American
strategic defensive potential. As the Administration sees it, Soviet
activities in the latter area have succeeded in undermining the basic
deterrent core of MAD and are indicative of Soviet contempt for the
arms control process
.
B. THE ARMS CONTROL RATIONALE
The on-going debate on the desirability of the SDI includes argu-
ments on the potential effects the program could have on strategic sta-
bility, specifically, that it might stimulate the Soviets into
accumulating even greater numbers of offensive weapons to offset US
defensive advantages. However, the Administration's apparent disregard
for Soviet threats to renew their offensive weapons buildup undoubtedly
has caused the Soviets to reconsider the US' attitude toward arms
control
.
1 . The Results of the SALT Process
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) have yielded three
major agreements: the SALT I Interim Agreement, the ABM Treaty (both
concluded in 1972), and the unratified SALT II accord of 1979. Despite
high hopes and some early indications of success, the SALT process has
failed to produce the more stable and peaceful world order originally
envisioned by many of its proponents [Ref. 14 :p. 69]. That the
Administration's disappointment with the arms control process is shared
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by some members of Congress is reflected in the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee report on SALT II:
"While giving due weight to these modest though useful steps, the
Committee is disappointed that more could not be achieved from the
arms control point of view.... The most important reason for the
Committee's sense of disappointment is the large increase in warheads
expected on both sides, despite the modest reduction in the number of
permitted launchers. Thus, paradoxically, a vast increase in the
quantity and destructiveness of each side's strategic power will
occur during the period of a treaty that seeks to limit strategic
offensive arms ." [Ref. 15]
There was indeed significant growth in the aggregate numerical
levels of US and Soviet ICBMs, SLBMs , and strategic bombers from the
beginning of SALT I in 1969 to the conclusion of SALT II in 1979. The
number of strategic delivery systems has remained relatively stable
since SALT II was signed. Beginning in the mid-1970s, however, ICBM
and SLBM reentry vehicle (RV) quantities have risen considerably on
both sides but in no case more dramatically than in Soviet ICBM RVs
.
According to the Department of Defense, Soviet RVs in this category
increased from a total of about 2,000 in 1975 to more than 6,000 in
1985. During the same period, US SLBM RV quantities also rose from
about 3,500 to more than 5,500. [Ref. 1:pp. 30-33]
From the Administration's perspective, the arms control process
has not only failed to inhibit growth in the superpowers' nuclear inven-
tories but, as indicated above, has resulted in a Soviet advantage in
land-based strategic missiles. In the view of Paul Nitze, a senior
arms control advisor, the failure of SALT to include controls on the
aggregate missile payload , or throwweight , of the forces on both sides,
and not just on the numbers of missile launchers, institutionalized the
Soviet ICBM advantage. [Ref. 14 :p. 66]
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The SALT process, moreover, is probably responsible in part for
aspects of Soviet political-military behavior that have worked to the
detriment of US interests. As discussed earlier, it is believed that
US recognition of the Soviet Union as an equal strategic power through
SALT I was responsible for setting in motion the Soviet program for
increased activism in the Third World during the mid-1970s. In any
case, the arms control process is not seen by the Administration as
having had a significant effect on curbing the Soviet drive for
superiority as evidenced in their strategic offensive and defensive
programs. As implied by Marshal Grechko's assertion that reliable
deterrence can be provided only by strengthening Soviet military
capabilities, arms control apparently does not rank high in Soviet
strategic thought as a means of safeguarding the security interests of
the USSR [Ref. 3:p. 85].
2 . The Question of Soviet Compliance
The Administration's confidence in the arms control process has
been further undermined by a perceived unwillingness on the part of the
Soviet Union to abide by either the spirit or the letter of arms
control agreements. In his report to the Congress documenting Soviet
violations of their arms control obligations, President Reagan has
stated:
"Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter. It calls into question
important security benefits from arms control and could create new
security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to an effec-
tive arms control process in the future. It increases doubts about
the reliability of the USSR as a negotiating partner and thus damages
the chances for establishing a more constructive US-Soviet
relationship." [Ref. 1:p. 23]
21
Among the numerous cases of Soviet violations and probable
violations cited by the President, some of the more important involve
activities within Soviet offensive and defensive programs. The
Administration has accused the Soviet Union of violating at least two
provisions of the SALT II accord: encryption of telemetry to impede
verification and development and testing of more than one new ICBM
[Ref. 13 :p. 244], The Administration is also convinced of the Soviet
commitment to build a nationwide BMD system similar to that envisioned
for the SDI . But while the SDI is defended on the grounds that the
character of its research is in no way illegal, Soviet BMD-related
activities are cited as flagrant violations of the ABM Treaty. Soviet
transgressions are said to include the configuration of the radar
located at Krasnoyarsk and the testing of SAM components in an ABM
mode, among others [Ref. 1:p. 231.
The Soviet BMD program as well as their efforts to deny the
United States critical verification data may not be mere violations of
arms control agreements. In the opinion of some analysts, they reflect
a larger Soviet program designed to deceive the West regarding Soviet
strategic capabilities and intentions [Ref. I6:pp. 41-42]. Such a
view is not contradicted by the Administration's assessment of the
Soviet approach to arms control.
3. The Need for "Real" Arms Control
Closely related to the problem of alleged Soviet arms control
violations is the issue of verification as a means of inhibiting such
behavior. The Soviet position on this issue (e.g., their refusal to
permit on-site inspections), coupled with the inherent limitations of
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remote surveillance systems, has caused some in the Administration to
be pessimistic on the ability of the US to monitor Soviet compliance
with specific treaty provisions. Confidence in negotiated agreements
as an effective means of arms control has thus been eroded:
"Soviet violations cast serious doubt on some of the key assumptions
about arms control that have guided US policy and Western public opi-
nion for 30 years. Specifically, they call into question that the
risk of detection would generally deter the Soviets from violating
their arms control obligations, or in the rare instances when the
Soviets would not be deterred, they would suffer serious
penalties ... .Our verification capabilities have not deterred the
Soviet Union from violating arms control agreements. Moreover, if
the Soviets are not made to account for their actions, it is unlikely
that they will be deterred from more serious violations. We must
approach arms control today more carefully than we have in the past."
[Ref. 1:p. 23]
The Reagan Administration's goals for achieving "real" arms
control are not substantially different from those of previous admi-
nistrations. The United States continues to maintain, for example,
that arms control accords should be effectively verifiable. What is
perhaps new in the current administration's position, however, is the
evident insistence that any new agreement be verifiable [Ref. 17].
As with its predecessors, the Reagan Administration also
expects arms control accords to reduce nuclear weapons to equal and
substantially lower levels and to increase strategic stability thereby
reducing the risk of war [Ref. 13:p. 249]. The Administration's
perception of the SALT agreements as having failed to achieve the
former goal have already been noted. SALT I and SALT II, by merely
limiting future arms growth, succeeded only in legitimizing such growth
while simultaneously leading to the current US position of perceived
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inferiority [Ref. 7:p. 173. The resulting imbalance has served to
decrease, not increase, strategic stability.
In the Administration's view, this state of affairs has arisen
partly through the failure of the United States to provide the Soviet
Union with incentives to bargain seriously. Arms control negotiations
are seen as having been conducted in relative isolation rather than as
a single element in a range of political, economic, and defense efforts
[Ref. 1 3 : P - 249 3. Thus, the results one could reasonably expect from
such negotiations have been unrealistically high particularly when
Soviet predispositions and behavior are considered. The alternative
approach now being pursued by the Reagan Administration has been to
predicate any new arms control agreement with the USSR on the
restoration of the strategic balance through mutual and verifiable
reduction, as opposed to limitation, of the strategic nuclear arsenals
of both sides with the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons
altogether
.
The manner in which the Reagan Administration intends to
restore and preserve the strategic balance is to bolster the US
deterrent capability through the modernization of strategic and
conventional forces. This provides an incentive for the Soviets to
agree to significant mutual arms reductions in the near term. [Ref.
7:p. 24 3
The far-term objective of further reducing or eliminating
nuclear weapons could be attained through the SDI. The implications of
an SDI deployment decision for US defense policy, however, are enormous
First of all, it would mean abandonment by the United States of the MAD
24
concept which has been widely perceived as the core of US deterrent
doctrine for a generation. Indeed, the Secretary of Defense has stated
that MAD had already been made "obsolete" by the Soviet pursuit of
offensive and defensive capabilities outlined above [Ref. 18].
A fundamental question that remains to be addressed is the
Soviet perception of US motives behind the SDI. The overt signal being
sent by the United States is that the SDI is a military countermeasure:
asymmetrical in response to the Soviet offensive buildup and
symmetrical as a means of redressing a perceived imbalance in strategic
defenses. The Administration is saying, in effect, that in the absence
of significant modifications in the Soviet attitude toward arms
control, the United States has no choice but to adopt measures similar
in nature to that being pursued by the Soviet Union. The problem is
that the Administration is convinced that the object of Soviet strategy
(as reflected in their strategic weapons programs) is the attainment of
superiority over the United States, notwithstanding Soviet assertions
to the contrary. The question is will the Soviets impute similar
motives to the Reagan Administration.
C. SUMMARY
A Soviet assessment of US motives in promoting the SDI would have
to consider the general climate of US-Soviet relations particularly
from the American point of view. The Soviets could not fail but to
acknowledge the Reagan Administration's appraisal of relations between
the two powers as being primarily one of conflict rather than
accomodation and competition rather than cooperation. Indeed, the
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Administration has gone out of its way to point out to the Soviets and
to world public opinion its belief in the fundamentally aggressive
nature of Soviet global ambitions and the ideology that underlies them.
The Administration has provided clear signals to the Soviets of its
awareness of the objectives of Soviet strategy and detailed knowledge
of the means available to the USSR for executing that strategy. Trends
in Soviet strategic forces, if allowed to proceed unimpeded would, in
the Administrations's estimate, enable the USSR to obtain a decisive
advantage in first-strike potential while eliminating the US capacity
for effective retaliation. Such a capability would enormously enhance
the coercive utility of Soviet nuclear weapons during a crisis. The
Administration has therefore recommended the Strategic Modernization
Program and the SDI as the means of redressing perceived imbalances in
strategic offensive and defensive forces.
That the Reagan Administration perceives it is compelled to resort
to a strategic buildup in order to reinforce strategic stability is an
expression of a lack of faith in the manner in which the United States
had previously conducted arms control. The failure to provide the
Soviet Union with adequate incentives to bargain seriously has enabled
the latter to sustain and legitimize the attainment of superiority in
land-based missiles. This situation has provided political pay-offs to
the Soviets by increasing confidence in their ability to pursue an
activist policy in the Third World with less concern for interference
by the United States.
The offensive side of the US response, as embodied in the Strategic
Modernization Program, would be interpreted by the Soviets as a
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worrisome but predictable development fully in keeping with the US
doctrine of deterrence through offensive means. The SDI is quite
another matter for it implies eventual US abandonment of the MAD
concept in favor of defenses which, in the context of Soviet strategic
doctrine, is a component of nuclear war-fighting—a possibility that
the Soviets can ill-afford to ignore.
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III. A DECEPTION HYPOTHESIS
The Administration's stated goal of eventually eliminating nuclear
weapons assumes that Soviet cooperation will be necessary if the goal
is to be achieved. This view was reflected in comments by LTG James A.
Abrahamson, Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
to the effect that a "totally effective defense" requires that the
Soviet Union agree to a "cooperative transition" from current
deterrence based on nuclear retaliation to defenses and a "carefully
drawn down" mutual reduction in arsenals of offensive missiles. At the
same time, a "modification" of the ABM Treaty will be necessary to
allow both the Americans and the Soviets to transition from a deterrent
posture based on retaliation to one based on defense [Ref. 1 9 :p . 10].
The problem, of course, is how to elicit Soviet cooperation in the pre-
vailing atmosphere of conflict and mutual suspicion that, from the
Soviet perspective, has been aggravated, not ameliorated, by the SDI.
The solution to this problem is suggested by the existence of the
SDI itself and may be summed up in the concept of compellant use of
military force. In theory, the compellant use of force deploys, or
threatens to deploy, military power either to stop an adversary from
doing something he has already undertaken or to force him to do
something not yet undertaken. Compellance, moreover, can employ force
physically or peacefully. [Ref. 20 :p. 29]
The relevance of compellance theory to Soviet strategic behavior
and the Administration's efforts to modify that behavior is readily
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seen. The existing condition of strategic instability and the
resulting reduction in the credibility of the US deterrent are a func-
tion of the buildup of Soviet strategic offensive and defensive forces.
In the long term, the Administration hopes to persuade the Soviets to
abandon their reliance on strategic offensive forces and to embrace
strategic defense. In the interim (i.e., during the SDI research
phase), the Administration aims to compel the Soviets to reduce the
size of their strategic offensive forces (particularly the ICBM com-
ponent) on a large scale while inhibiting further advancements in stra-
tegic defenses. The objective, in other words, is to force the Soviets
to engage in "real" arms control.
The mechanism of compellance is the US' own Strategic Modernization
Program and the SDI which together are intended to evoke a more
cooperative attitude on the part of the Soviet government. The rela-
tionship between these programs and their combined effect on Soviet
arms control behavior was explicitly stated by both the Secretaries of
State and Defense:
"First, we must modernize our offensive nuclear forces in order to
ensure the essential military balance in the near term, and to pro -
vide the incentives necessary for the Soviet Union to join us in
negotiating significant, equitable, and verifiable nuclear arms
reductions ... .Second , we must act now to start constructing a more
reliable strategic order for the long term by examining the potential
for future effective defenses against ballistic missiles ... .The SDI
provides a necessary and powerful deterrent to any near-term Soviet
decision to expand rapidly its ABM capability beyond that permitted
by the ABM Treaty. The overriding importance of (the SDI), however,
is the promise it offers of moving to a better, more stable basis for
deterrence in the future and of providing new and compelling incen -
tives to the Soviet Union to agree to progressively deeper negotiated
reductions in offensive nuclear arms ." [Ref. 21 :p. 4] (Emphasis
added)
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The negative character of the US "incentive" is clear enough though
there is obviously no guarantee that the Administration's compellant
strategy will succeed. Yet the return of the Soviets to the arms
control talks in Geneva in March 1985 (following a 15 month absence)
was encouraging to many SDI supporters particularly when it became
apparent that the SDI had become the central element of the talks [Ref.
22].
The view that renewed Soviet interest in pursuing serious arms
control negotiations was at least partially attributable to the SDI was
reinforced by the Soviet proposal of late-September 1985 for signifi-
cant reductions in land-based missiles in exchange for a halt in SDI
research [Ref. 5J. Though the Administration perceived serious flaws
in some aspects of the Soviet offer (beyond the proposed ban on SDI
research which was quickly rejected), it was nevertheless received as a
possible basis for more substantial negotiations [Ref. 23]. Some SDI
supporters were inclined to take this one step further by attributing
the apparent change in Soviet attitudes as a direct result of the SDI.
In the words of Richard G. Lugar, Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee:
"Now, however, Moscow has indicated that it is prepared to consider
deep cuts in nuclear inventories. Leaving aside for the moment the
specific problems with the Soviet offer, it seems reasonable to
conclude that it has been because of, not in spite of, the Strategic
Defense Initiative. The Initiative has already achieved its first
notable success." [Ref. 24]
While such a conclusion may be debatable, the SDI has undoubtedly
been successful in capturing the Soviets' attention. They are clearly
worried about the SDI but the issue that remains to be addressed is the
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nature of their concern. The Soviets are surely aware of the
Administration's compellant objectives for the SDI during the program's
research phase. However, they probably also harbor serious doubts that
the Administration's intentions for the SDI are limited only to
achieving those stated or implied objectives relating to arms control
and restoration of the strategic balance. Rather, it is likely that
the Soviets will perceive the SDI as part of an attempt by the United
States to regain the position of strategic superiority which it unila-
terally surrendered in the early 1970s. The SDI will be perceived, in
other words, as the key component of a strategic deception with grave
implications for Soviet political-military strategy.
The Soviets have undoubtedly been following the SDI debate with
great interest. The positions of the United States and European NATO
governments on the SDI and how the populations of the principal
countries respond to these positions will be a significant factor in
the Soviet public campaign against the program. More importantly, the
Soviets will be searching for indications of the Administration's true
intentions for the SDI, i.e., whether the intent is merely to compel a
restoration of the strategic equilibrium (as the Administration claims)
as opposed to an attempt to achieve strategic superiority (which
implies deception).
It will be argued below that strategic deception by the United
States in peacetime is theoretically possible. An assumption central
to deception theory is that cover, the effort to protect and obscure a
secret, is necessary to all deceptions. Yet there have been instances
(such as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968) where deception
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serves the purposes of the deceiver better if the cover remains
"transparent" [Ref. 25 :p. 364]. Using the concept of "transparent
cover" as the primary vehicle, the possible deceptive utility of the
SDI will be examined. The object of this investigation is not to
"prove" that the intent of the SDI is anything other than what the
Administration claims it to be. Rather, if the SDI as deception can be
established on a theoretical basis, Soviet claims that the program
actually is a deception will appear more credible as a reflection of
their actual views and not merely as propaganda.
The deceptive potential of the SDI will be considered in terms of
its enabling the United States to manipulate the perceptions of the
Soviet leadership. It will be argued that the nature of the SDI
program has placed the Administration in a position to exploit Soviet
preconceptions regarding their own weaknesses and Western strengths
while heightening Soviet concerns over possible US intentions.
A. DECEPTION PRACTICE IN OPEN SOCIETIES
Factors that are believed to work against the practice of strategic
deception in peacetime by the United States are of two types: cultural
and institutional. Though the present discussion focuses on the
latter aspect , the question of deception as a function of culture
deserves some attention particularly as it is reflected in strategic
culture
.
Conventional wisdom holds that a country like the United States,
with a culture noted for the openness, even the naivete of its
interpersonal interactions, might find strategic deception uncongenial
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to its habitual ways of thinking [Ref. 25 :p. 13]. Highly placed
values such as honesty and fairplay, it would seem, run counter to the
practice of deceit as a significant element in the American mind-set.
Yet American culture is not without its own traits of deception, from
the hyperbole of Madison Avenue, to trick plays in football, the prac-
tice of industrial espionage, the shrewd "Yankee trader," and bluffing
at poker [Ref. 26 :p. 42].
These and other examples that the reader can probably offer, while
trivial in themselves, suggest an important principle: the tendency
toward, or the inhibitions against, the practice of deception in
American society or elsewhere depends upon the context, or environment,
in which the actors find themselves. That is, the question of whether
or not deception is an appropriate form of behavior is not so much
driven by cultural idiosyncracies as it is by the perceived nature of
the existing situation, the goals of the individual, and his assessment
of the motives of others including the willingness of the latter to
abide by the "rules of the game." This should apply to interstate as
well as to interpersonal relations.
In wartime, of course, the United States labors under no inhibi-
tions regarding the use of deception for achieving military goals. For
example, US-British cooperation in the use of Ultra intelligence in
deceiving the Germans during World War II has been well documented
[Ref. 27]. Generally speaking, as the factor of surprise has been
cited as a basic principle of warfare over time and across cultures, it
is natural to expect that deception as a means of facilitating surprise
would be integral to US military doctrine in time of war. The primary
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difference between American and Soviet military doctrines in this
regard is perhaps the greater emphasis placed by the Soviets on
maskirovka in its various forms.
The contrast between apparent Soviet and American attitudes toward
the peacetime use of deception outside of the battlefield context are
considerably more pronounced. The source of this difference may be
found in the Soviet view of peace as merely a "cease-fire" in a
continuous and unending war over resources and ideology. In a per-
manent state of war, all means and methods can be justified including
the use of deception in pursuit of strategic goals [Ref. 28:p. 138].
It is the Soviet predisposition to the practice of deception, to the
widespread and systematic use of deceit as policy, which makes
appraisal of the threat difficult and arms control uncertain [Ref.
26:p. 37].
It is the recognition of these fundamental Soviet attitudes and,
more importantly, the skepticism that Soviet behavior can be moderated
without considerable pressure from the United States (particularly
through negative incentives) that distinguishes the polices of the
Reagan Administration from those of its recent predecessors. The
conflictive nature of current US-USSR relations, from the
Administration's perspective, is the result of a Soviet worldview that
allows, even mandates, the latter' s attempt to secure unilateral advan-
tages by all means short of war. The Soviets have, in effect, set
the "rules of the game" and have compelled the United States to adopt
new initiatives that will safeguard its security. If context is more
important than cultural constraints as a factor in strategic deception,
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it would seem that the conditions necessary for the practice of decep-
tion by the United States in peacetime are present whether or not
deception is actually being implemented.
A more significant constraint on the practice of strategic decep-
tion by open societies in peacetime is the character of their political
and military institutions. Here the Soviets have a definite advantage.
Soviet-style totalitarianism facilitates their use of deception in such
areas as the requirement for operational security. For most deception
operations this requirement is best satisfied when the operation is
well-organized and well-coordinated [Ref. 25 :p. 16]. Indeed, the case
for systematic Soviet deception over the years would seem to imply the
existence of special agencies for that purpose possibly as part of the
state (KGB) or military (GRU) intelligence organizations [Ref. 28 :p.
139 3. While the actual planning and coordinating agencies for Soviet
strategic deception cannot be substantiated in the open literature,
Soviet strategic culture would dictate the necessity of centralized
control at the highest levels.
The Soviet need for control, particularly of information, is also
reflected in the nature of their political decisionmaking process and
in the relationship between the Soviet people and their government.
The decision to divulge information pertaining to official policy is a
function of the will of the Communist Party which reserves the right,
and has the power, to determine when the conditions for doing so are
appropriate. Moreover, once the decision to inform the public is made,
the party's control over the media enables it to determine the form and
content of the information it releases thus providing the capacity to
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control the public debate surrounding any particular governmental
action. Thus, when a major defense policy decision involves deception,
say, in the construction of a national ABM system, once the decision to
proceed is made, Soviet deception planners are limited mainly by the
intelligence capabilities of an opponent.
The freedom to debate public policy issues, including defense
policy is, of course, one of the fundamental strengths of Western
democratic government. It limits the ability of the executive to adopt
policies or programs that may not be considered as being in the
national interest by other branches of government or by the public at
large. The leadership is therefore obliged to justify major
initiatives both to domestic audiences and, if the initiative affects
strategic policy, to allies as well if the program is to be
successfully implemented .
In its presentation of the merits of the SDI, the Reagan
Administration has emphasized the potential of the program to ultima-
tely eliminate the specter of nuclear war. Implicit in its case for
the SDI is the perception of a state of strategic instability resulting
from the growth of Soviet offensive and defensive programs. However,
the implications of the SDI for US strategic and NATO doctrine have
stimulated a major public debate concerning the program's technical
feasibility and strategic desirability. The Administration has
endeavored to defend the SDI on both counts while continuing to main-
tain its originally stated position, i.e., the elimination of nuclear
weapons through non-nuclear strategic defense.
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The Administration has further sought to buttress its persuasive
argument in two ways: first, by highlighting the potential spin-offs
of SDI research, for example, in the form of economic and technological
benefits, and second, by making an explicit connection between the SDI
and Soviet strategic programs and the utility of the SDI in forcing
Soviet concessions in arms control negotiations [Ref. 21].
B. STRATEGIC DECEPTION UNDER "TRANSPARENT COVER"
The Soviets are aware of the inherent limitations of the West in
conducting strategic deception in peacetime. In the same way that
deception practice is aided by the closed nature of the Soviet system,
the very openness of Western society not only enables the Soviets to
participate in the defense policy debate but also constrains the abi-
lity of Western governments to use deception in peacetime, assuming the
inclination to do so exists.
What follows is an investigation of how such constraints might be
alleviated through the employment of "transparent cover" whereby the
Administration's persuasive and compellant objectives for the SDI as
well as deceptive objectives (as viewed by the Soviets) might be
attained. It bears repeating that the deception hypothesis does not
posit that the SDI, in whole or in part, is actually intended to
deceive the Soviet leadership. The purpose is to establish a framework
for analyzing the Soviet response to the SDI based on the assumption
(reasonable from the Soviet viewpoint) that the intent behind the
program could include deception.
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1 . The Objectives of Deception
The process of deception involves the deliberate misrepresen-
tation of reality for the purpose of gaining a competitive advantage
[Ref. 25 :p. 33. As seen by the Soviets, the advantage of the SDI lies
in its potential for elevating the United States to a position of stra-
tegic superiority. It is important to note that superiority in this
sense is not limited to the strictly military attribute of a first-
strike capability though such is obviously a key Soviet concern.
Rather, the main threat of the SDI in combination with the program to
modernize US strategic offensive forces lies in the net impact of an
improved US strategic posture in altering the global correlation of
forces in a manner unfavorable to the Soviets. The main threat posed
by US strategic superiority, in other words, is the implication that
the neutralization of the Soviet advantage in the strategic military
correlation could result in a reduction in the political utility of
military power for the Soviets in peacetime. In the efforts of the
Reagan Administration to wrest the strategic initiative away from the
Soviet Union, the latter will be inclined to see elements of both
intent and capability deception in the SDI.
Earlier it was stated that the primary theme of the
Administration's persuasive argument for the SDI is the ultimate elimi-
nation of both American and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons. Yet the
compellant component of the Administration's case includes proceeding
with SDI research as a technological "hedge" while continuing with the
modernization of US offensive forces. Both aspects of the US strategic
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program are intended as incentives to compel the Soviets into accepting
meaningful arms reductions.
The problem with the Administration's stated intentions, par-
ticularly from the Soviet viewpoint, is the former's position on the
efficacy of arms control, at least as it has been conducted to date.
The prevailing opinion is essentially that arms hasn't worked nor,
given the Soviet tendency to violate arms control agreements, is it
likely to work in the future without a fundamental change in Soviet
attitudes. Such a view helps to explain the Administration's adamant
refusal to allow the SDI to become a negotiable issue in the Geneva
talks. Consider the remarks of Secretary of Defense Weinberger:
"Some critics would have us use SDI as a bargaining chip at Geneva in
the hope of gaining concessions from the Soviets on the size of their
offensive force. There are two reasons why we will not do this.
First, if SDI bears fruit, it offers the hope, available nowhere
else, of moving the world out of the horrible shadow of the nuclear
threat. Second, history has taught us not to delude ourselves in
thinking that if we halt SDI research, or bargain it away at
Geneva, the Soviets will desist in their offensive and defensive
buildup." [Ref. 29]
President Reagan has stated that while a negotiated agreement
on the mutual reduction of nuclear weapons is the preferred alter-
native, such an agreement would not inhibit SDI research. Moreover,
the United States reserved the right to make the SDI deployment deci-
sion unilaterally following "consultations" with the allies and the
Soviet government [Ref. 30]. Thus, the Administration has indicated
that it intends to proceed with SDI research regardless of the outcome
of the arms control talks
.
From the Soviet perspective, the Administration's "all or
nothing" position would seem to discredit the SDI's incentive rationale
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for it requires the Soviet Union to forfeit the heart of its strategic
defenses: the ICBM component. If positions were reversed, it is unli-
kely that the United States would agree to such terms. Neither is it
reasonable to expect the Soviets to place their security in the hands
of what they perceive as a hostile power. Since the Soviets must
necessarily reject any such proposal, and would perceive that the US
government must anticipate this, the former might reason that the
intent behind the SDI presumes the continued existence of nuclear arse-
nals on both sides for if the Soviet Union declines significant weapons
reductions then the United States has no incentive to do so either.
The Soviets might well conclude, then, that the actual intent of the
SDI is to provide a shield for US offensive forces which themselves are
undergoing modernization. Indeed, these are precisely the motives
imputed to the Soviet government by the Reagan Administration.
Such a perception on the part of the Soviet leadership is rein-
forced by the inherent limitations of strategic defenses as well as
their potential offensive applications. Taken together, these con-
siderations lend credence to a Soviet view of the SDI as a deception in
capability as well as of intent. First of all, it seems safe to assume
that the Soviets are well aware of the strengths and limitations of
strategic defenses if the Administration's assessment of long-term
Soviet activities in this area are correct. If so, the Soviets must
then suspect that a perfect defense of national territory is not
possible, that is, that the system can be countered in a number of ways
or simply overwhelmed by saturation (another incentive for the Soviets
to increase rather than decrease their offensive forces). The Soviets
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have, in fact, made statements to this effect in their response to the
SDI [Ref. 31 :p. 21] which will be more fully developed below.
The Reagan Administration has continued to stress its commit-
ment to pursue a total "multilayer" defense however difficult such a
defense would be to achieve [Ref. 19 3. Yet spokesman for the
Department of Defense [Ref. 32] and the Director of the US Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency have argued that a less than totally effective
defense could still contribute to deterrence. As Kenneth Adelman has
pointed out:
"The results of SDI are years away, and naturally we do not know what
they will be. Estimates vary widely. We can surmise now, however,
that even a less than perfect or less than comprehensive defense
could markedly increase the uncertainty of success to a potential
attacker. And this, after all, is the quintessence of deterrence."
[Ref. 13:p. 252]
The Soviets are aware of this, of course, but what they fear
most is that a future American administration might come to the
conclusion that has been attributed to the Soviets themselves: a
limited strategic defense, i.e., one designed to protect key nodes of
an offensive system (ICBM sites, command and control facilities, and so
forth) is far less expensive than one designed for total defense of
national or, if allies are included, international territory and popu-
lations. Such a defense would still enhance a country's war survival
capability by helping to insure the survivability of its retaliatory
forces against surprise or preemptive attack. But a limited defense in
conjunction with an effective offensive force also improves a country's
ability to prosecute a war by degrading or cancelling an enemy's capa-
city to retaliate after suffering a first strike [Ref. 33]. It is the
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potential of the SDI for enabling the United States to conduct a first
strike that is at the heart of Soviet concerns. Additionally, the per-
ception of strategic advantage provided by the SDI would significantly
increase the political utility of US military power in terms of
bolstering NATO solidarity and providing coercive leverage against the
Soviet Union during crisis situations.
The Soviets would thus be inclined to see the capability decep-
tion aspect of the SDI revealed in the continuing US insistence that
defensive technology will permit the shift to a totally defensive
posture by both sides while Soviet experience and a considerable body
of opinion in the West indicates otherwise. This view will be rein-
forced by the perception that Western technology will provide the capa-
bility for constructing a limited defense that will still provide
significant military, and hence political, advantages. Such a defense
will, in any case, be superior to that built by the Soviet Union given
the inferiority of its technology base. Finally, economic constraints
will probably force the United States into adopting the most effective
system at the lowest cost which inevitably means a limited, or war-
survival, defense similar in nature to that of the USSR.
2 . The Dynamics of Deception
The preceding discussion provided what the Soviets might reaso-
nably infer as the deceptive objectives of the SDI. What follows is an
investigation of how the United States might achieve these objectives
in the process of persuading domestic and allied audiences of the need
to force a change in Soviet strategic behavior. The mechanism by which
this can be accomplished is "transparent cover" whereby all but the
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most crucial aspects of the deception would remain unconcealed.
Concealment in this case would entail maintaining the ambiguity of
ultimate US intentions for the SDI
.
Two important elements of deception are the goal of surprise
and the mode of secrecy for insuring surprise. In the case of strate-
gic deception, both are exceedingly difficult to achieve because of the
usual size of the operation, the number of individuals and organiza-
tions involved (which leads to greater insecurity), and the enemy's
surveillance capability which is continually improving through advances
in remote sensing technology. Constraints such as these are compounded
in the West by the need for a broad consensus on defense issues which
necessarily stimulates a great deal of debate among the public and bet-
ween and among governments and their bureaucracies who are competing
over policy preferences and resources. Such an environment inevitably
promotes "leaks" either deliberate or merely as an unfortunate by-
product of information exchange on a large scale.
As concerns the SDI, the requirement for secrecy for insuring
surprise was eliminated at the outset because, for all intents and pur-
poses, the element of surprise in the SDI was achieved by the program's
very announcement. Indeed, from the information available on the
events leading up to the President's 23 March 1983 speech, it would
appear that many of even his closest advisors were purposefully kept in
the dark about its contents until shortly before the address. The
reason for the "close hold" nature of the SDI's early handling was
apparently to avoid any real policy debate. Specifically, it was
feared that had the plan been run through the orthodox interagency
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review process, immediate objections would either have slowed its
progress or stopped the plan altogether [Ref. 34]. Such reasoning
remains speculative. What is certain, however, is that most of the
governmental bureaucracy was as surprised as the Soviets to learn of
the apparently drastic change in US strategic policy. This is
reflected in comments by former Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig,
Jr., referring to the aftermath of the President's speech the next day
in the Pentagon, "...where they were all rushing around saying, 'What
the hell is strategic defense?'" [Ref. 35].
Of more concern to this discussion is the Soviet perception not
only of the SDI announcement's content but also of their view of the
President's tactics leading up to it. Unfortunately, it is unlikely
that information on the latter will ever be revealed. It is
interesting to note, however, the reflections of strategic deception
analyst Barton Whaley:
"The one certain way of assuring perfect secrecy of plans is for the
top decision maker to keep his own counsel, witholding his intentions
and final decision until the last moment ... .Opposing intelligence
services have no direct means of penetrating this particular veil
of security, short of subverting the reticent top decision maker
himself." [Ref. 36:pp. 226-227]
The meaning behind these words should certainly be familiar to
the Soviet leadership and deception planners who undoubtedly appreciate
the advantages of centralized decision making in helping to insure
operational security. It would be reasonable for the Soviets to search
for similar attributes in the behavior of others. Yet, the most that
can be said regarding the birth of the SDI from the Soviet standpoint
is that its unusual delivery was bound to arouse their suspicions.
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In any case, with the "surprise" of the SDI revealed up-front
the requirement for secrecy now applied mainly to discrete technical
aspects of the program which are much easier to manage. Otherwise, the
Administration has been able to be completely open about the SDI. In
fact, for the broader aspects of the program including the need to
"sell" the SDI to domestic and West European audiences as well as to
insure that the SDI's compellant message was received be the Soviet
leadership, secrecy was not only unnecessary but also undesirable.
Thus, by late-1984, the traditional shroud of secrecy over weapons
research had been lifted from the SDI and the Strategic Defense
Initiative Organization quickly became a fount of information for
anyone wishing to know more about the program, particularly Congress
and the allies, but presumably also the Soviets within obvious limits
[Ref. 37:p. 36].
The reduced requirement for security also facilitates
Administration efforts to demonstrate the feasibility of the SDI as a
means of bolstering the persuasive argument. A number of tests of SDI
components have been conducted and their results highly publicized.
These tests have ranged from laser-tracking of objects in space to
exploding objects on the ground using a high-powered laser, among other
experiments [Ref. 38]. Demonstrations such as these obviously enhance
the Adminstration's persuasive and compellant cases but they also serve
an important requirement of deception: establishing the plausibility
that the deceiver actually has the capability to do what the deception
commits him to do [Ref. 25:p. 18].
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In their presentation of propositions on military deception,
Daniel and Herbig point out that knitting the deception into many
strands of truth is an important part of reinforcing its credibility,
i.e., the cover story ought to be as near the "real thing" as possible
[Ref. 25:pp. 19-20]. As concerns the SDI, the technical aspects of
the program which are intended to serve the Administration's compellant
objectives are useful for deception as well depending upon the
Administration's ultimate intentions. It is the very ambiguity of
these intentions that creates the opportunity to exploit Soviet precon-
ceptions in a manner beneficial to compellance or deception, as the
following discussion demonstrates.
3 . Exploiting Soviet Preconceptions
The success of deception is facilitated if the preconceptions
of the target can be anticipated and played upon [Ref. 36 :p. 225].
This view of Barton Whaley has its counterpart in the Soviet concept of
"reflexive control" which emphasizes the requirement for a complete
knowledge of the enemy in order to influence his perceptions, and
hence, his behavior [Ref. 39 :p. 23]. Both views infer that the
stronger the dispositions of the target, the more likely he will ignore
or twist information inconsistent with them and, in the process, become
an unwitting and cooperative victim of the deceiver [Ref. 25 :p. 21].
Certain aspects of the Soviet strategic mind-set are subject to
manipulation by means of the SDI. Included here are the need for
superior military power, respect for the potential of Western tech-
nology, and the utility of strategic deception in peacetime.
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The Soviet Union, like the United States, has confronted the
hard realities of modern weapons technology and accepted, on a prac-
tical level, a deterrent relationship based on mutual societal vulnera-
bility [Ref. 40:p. 6]. However, in their unending search for absolute
security, the Soviets have apparently concluded that deterrence is best
achieved by building a force capable of dominating events in war and
preparing for nuclear war in order to optimize their chances for sur-
vival [Ref. 41 :p. 213].
In the Soviet view, superior military power is not only a pre-
requisite for deterrence against military threats but also creates an
environment for achieving political aims as well. As the buildup of
Soviet strategic forces proceeded to a level of parity with those of
the United States, the former's leadership apparently became convinced
that Soviet military might had neutralized US military power and thus
helped create an international climate in which socialism and
"progressive forces" could flourish [Ref. 40 :p. 19]. The Soviet per-
ception of the shift in the global correlation of forces was codified
in SALT I, reinforced by signs that the United States had assumed as
defensive posture during the Vietnam war, and manifiested in an
increased level of Soviet activism in the Third World during the 1970s.
Soviet military power had thus made it more dangerous for the United
States to try to gain political benefits from military threats [Ref.
40 :p. 20], By the same token, any relative advantage gained by the
Soviets in military capability would increase their confidence in the
ability to achieve political objectives with relatively less concern
for interference by the United States.
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Soviet policy in the 1970s was to continue to pursue improve-
ments in their strategic posture but to do so without provoking a reac-
tion from the West. They seemed satisified with the outcome of SALT
(which assured their advantage in land-based strategic missiles) and
the ABM Treaty (that contained the threat to their ICBM force from US
strategic defenses) [Ref. 42:p. 18], The Soviet Union continued to
abide by the MAD concept as a practical, but temporary, necessity but
was actively seeking to escape its confines through force structure
adjustments and weapons development (e.g., ABMs) that would increase
the credibility of its war-fighting/war-survival doctrine [Ref. 41 :p.
217]. At the same time, the Soviets were quick to condemn any per-
ceived changes in US strategic doctrine designed to enhance the credi-
bility of, or hinted at a shift away from, reliance on assured
destruction as the basic premise for that doctrine.
The reason for Soviet alarm over such US doctrinal concepts as
"counterforce" (in the 1960s) and "limited nuclear options" (in the
1970s) seems clear in retrospect. From their perspective, such strate-
gies indicated that the United States was moving toward the adoption of
a nuclear war-fighting doctrine of its own. Indeed, a move in this
direction was probably regarded as inevitable. Soviet strategic
doctrine, based on "scientifically derived laws of war," dictated that
it reflect the capacity for war winning, war survival, and recovery as
the only really logical alternative. Strategic planners in the United
States were regarded as essentially rational and so could be expected
to adopt a similar doctrine eventually. The question was thus one of
which side would escape MAD first. [Ref. 43:pp. 171-172]
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The announcement of the SDI, then, while undoubtedly surprising
to the Soviets, was probably not totally unexpected. The SDI will be
perceived as a deception, however, in the sense that the
Administration's position that the United States seeks no military or
political benefits from the program, from the Soviet point of view, are
dubious at best [Ref. 44].
A second aspect of the Soviet strategic outlook susceptible to
exploitation through the SDI is the former's deep and even awesome
respect for the economic, scientific, and technological resources of
the United States and the realizable military potential in them [Ref.
4:p. 8], An attempt by the United States to achieve a technological
"end run" around Soviet strategy is credible to the latter because, as
stated previously, while a total strategic defense may not be possible,
any limited defense deployed by the Americans is likely to be perceived
by the Soviet leadership as more capable than anything Soviet tech-
nology can produce. Here again, military advantage translates to poli-
tical leverage in the correlation of forces calculus
.
The deceptive utility of the SDI also resides in its potential
as an instrument of economic-technological warfare. Whether or not the
SDI is ever actually deployed, Soviet efforts to counter the program
would be expensive as they themselves have admitted [Ref. 46]. The
prospect of yet another military buildup must be unsettling to the
Soviet leadership in view of the existing constraints and weaknesses of
their economy. They must also consider the possibility that the
"technological breakthrough" potential of the SDI could be intended to
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induce the investment of huge amounts of money, man-hours, and time in
the wrong direction [Ref. 28:p. 125].
For the Soviets to see deception in certain aspects of the SDI
may be natural given their tendency to use this device in peacetime
themselves. Mihalka has provided evidence of a sustained deception
effort that has involved elements of both the Soviet strategic offen-
sive and defensive forces including their ABM program [Ref. 16],
The Soviets undoubtedly appreciate the limitations of open
societies in the practice of peacetime deception. On the other hand,
they appear to respect the capabilities of US intelligence agencies and
have not hidden their suspicion of the undue influence that the
Pentagon and certain "right-wing" elements have on the policymaking
process. Such anxieties have not diminished during the tenure of the
Reagan Administration. While the Soviet view of the conspiratorial
nature of US intentions should not be overstated, the inclination to
distrust foreigners is deeply rooted in the Russian mind-set. This
tendency has only been reinforced by a communist ideology that assumes
that the capitalists will always try to deceive and therefore should
never be trusted in the first place [Ref. 28 :p. 139 3.
C. SUMMARY
The purpose of the preceding discussion was to establish a fra-
mework for an analysis of the Soviet response to the SDI. It was
hypothesized that this response could include indications of the per-
ception by the Soviets of deception among Reagan Administration motives
for promoting the SDI. The Soviet response is also certain to include
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other themes of a propaganda nature that are designed to undercut sup-
port for the SDI in Western Europe and the United States. But if the
SDI as deception could be established on a theoretical basis, Soviet
claims of deception would appear more credible as a reflection of their
actual views rather than merely as propaganda. This was accomplished
by demonstrating that, given the will to do so, some of the constraints
that limit the ability of an open society to use deception on a large
scale in peacetime could be overcome by means of "transparent cover."
As concerns the SDI, transparent cover would involve being as open
about as many aspects of the program as possible except for the sen-
sitive military-technical details of the systems involved and the ulti-
mate intention for those systems following the decision to deploy them.
Doing so permits the Administration to pursue persuasive objectives at
home and in Western Europe and its compellant objectives vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union taking full advantage of media resources while simulta-
neously reducing security requirements to a more manageable level.
The plausibility of the SDI as deception is supported by the near
coincidence of the US* compellant and potentially deceptive intentions.
The Administration has emphasized the compellant argument, i.e., the
need to restore strategic equilibrium by forcing a change in Soviet
behavior. The intent behind the SDI, it is argued, is limited to rein-
forcing the status-quo (during the research phase) and ultimately to
eliminate the need for nuclear weapons.
The Soviets, on the other hand, can be expected to see the SDI
research phase as an attempt by the United States to revise the status-
quo in a manner favorable to the latter with the ultimate intention of
51
achieving a position of strategic superiority following deployment. In
their view, superiority is a function not merely of capability in a
strictly military sense but also of the political leverage that mili-
tary power provides. Of course, such considerations are important to
both sides. But Moscow would be more inclined to see its zero-sum
ramifications since military power is perhaps the sole attribute of
Soviet strength. Therefore, any unfavorable shift in this key aspect
of the correlation of forces is bound to be politically and psychologi-
cally disturbing.
The tendency of the Soviet leadership to perceive deceptive intent
in the SDI is further reinforced by a number of other preconceptions.
Prominent among these is the belief that a totally effective defense
(which is necessary to the elimination of nuclear weapons) is probably
technically impossible. However, a limited defense is feasible
particularly for the United States given its technological advantage.
For the United States to adopt a limited strategic defense is predic-
table, moreover, since the only rational way to deter nuclear war, in
the Soviet view, is to prepare to fight and survive such a conflict.
This perception is supported by the belief that the United States can-
not really expect the USSR to sacrifice its main deterrent (land-based
missiles), in effect, placing its security in the hands of the enemy.
The United States must therefore expect to keep, and even modernize,
its offensive component which implies a shift not to defense alone but
to a combined offensive-defensive strategy similar to, but probably
more capable than, the Soviets' own.
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Finally, the Soviets may be inclined to see their own attitude
toward strategic deception reflected in the behavior of others. During
the postwar years, the Soviet Union has apparently used deception to
its advantage in some cases while in others such use has backfired as,
for example, in its encouragement of the "missile gap" myth. Yet a
worldview that defines peace as a temporary suspension of international
violence naturally accepts the continuing attempt to secure strategic
advantage by all means short of war itself. It is also natural to
expect such attempts on the "imperialist" side, including the use of
deception, especially when the political environment is oriented toward
conflict rather than detente.
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IV. THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE SDI
In this part, the Soviet response to the SDI will be examined from
the time of the program's announcement in March 1 983 to the Geneva sum-
mit in November 1985. The objective is to distinguish the actual per-
ception of the SDI from the purely propaganda element in the public
statements and positions of the Soviet leadership.
Research involving the use of Soviet open source materials must
consider their propaganda intent and the resulting effect on reliabi-
lity. The assumption made here is that most Soviet official statements
are motivated by their potential propaganda benefits. However, this
does not necessarily disqualify such statements as total fabrications.
Propaganda simply implies that the speaker seeks some payoff, usually
political, from the impact of his statements; the basis for his state-
ments can range from a lie, on the one hand, to something approaching
the truth on the other. The aim here is to determine the degree to
which the various themes employed by the Soviets with respect to the
SDI tend toward the latter end of this continuum. This involves iden-
tifying the meaning behind a given statement by analyzing it in a poli-
tical, military, or other context. In this way, while actual Soviet
beliefs can never be positively determined, they can at least be reaso-
nably estimated. To the extent that this process is successful, the
fact that the Soviet media is closely controlled by the party helps to
reinforce the validity of Soviet public statements as actual views of
the party leadership.
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The approach taken for this analysis was to select a sample of 200
articles from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily
Report on the Soviet Union during the period March 1983 through July
1985. The data base was subdivided into four periods of 50 articles
each roughly corresponding to the tenures of Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU) General Secretaries Andropov (March 1983-February
1984), Chernenko (early sub-period March 1984-September 1984 and late
sub-period October 1984-March 1985), and Gorbachev (April 1985-July
1985). The quantitative portion of the content analysis was restricted
to sources of the party-managed media, for example, TASS, Radio Moscow,
Pravda, and so forth, which are the responsibility of the International
Information Department of the Communist Party Central Committee [Ref.
47 :p. 20]. It was assumed that these sources would reflect the pre-
vailing Soviet position and would be supported by sources representing
other elite groups such as the military, the scientific, and the acade-
mic establishments.
A qualitiative analysis of selected articles published during the
quantitative study period was also conducted for the period leading to
the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in November 1985. Significant statements
from party and other elite sources were drawn and, as for the quan-
titative portion, all addressed the subject of the SDI. The intent of
the qualitative analysis was to expand and elaborate the meaning of
certain themes identified in the quantitative investigation.
It was anticipated that the Soviet response to the SDI would con-
tain both defensive and offensive elements. The defensive reaction
would derive from the Soviet view of the SDI as part of an effort by
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the United States to seize the strategic initiative by neutralizing the
military component of Soviet strategy. The Soviets would thus be
inclined to see deception behind the SDI and would therefore reject the
Administration's threat and arms control rationales for the program.
The offensive aspect of the Soviet response would be reflected in their
efforts to undermine European support for the program which could
contribute to the weakening of NATO.
The quantitative analysis of the Soviet response identified four
major topics of interest (see Table 1). Three of these topics per-
tained to the Soviet view of the SDI as a threat, i.e., the defensive
aspect. Specifically, these topics were SDI's role in contributing to
the achievement of US political-military objectives (Topic I); US
intentions for the SDI (Topic II); and the consequences of the SDI
(Topic III). Topic IV concerned the SDI in the context of Western
Europe. Here the offensive aspect of the Soviet response was revealed
in themes designed to exploit the propaganda opportunities arising from
the European view of the SDI. Each of these topics had their own set
of themes which are described below.
Table 1 illustrates the proportion of the 50 article sample in
which the topic appears. For example, in the first (Andropov) period,
Topic I appeared in slightly more than 60 percent of the sample or
about 30 articles. The purpose of the appearance/non-appearance cri-
terion was simply to establish the relative emphasis on topics over
time. What Table 1 indicates is a gradual shift in emphasis away from
those topics pertaining to Soviet-American relations toward attention
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By the time that Gorbachev came to power, the topic of the SDI's
implications for Western Europe appeared to dominate Soviet attention.
The relative decrease in Soviet references to the other topics is more
apparent than real, however. Some of the themes contained within these
topics, particularly those addressing the SDI's consequences, continued
to be emphasized but in terms of their impact on Western Europe.
A fifth topic concerned the Soviet view of deception behind the
SDI. Since this view was indicated in statements and inferences found
within the other topics, no attempt was made to aggregate direct Soviet
references to deception in Table 1. But the deception topic, like the
others, had its own set of themes which are discussed below.
A. SDI IN THE SOVIET-AMERICAN CONTEXT
Prior to 1985, the Soviet public response to the SDI was directed
mainly toward US strategic behavior and the general implications of the
program. Four major topics were addressed: the objectives of US
political-military strategy; US intentions for the SDI; the consequen-
ces of the SDI; and SDI as deception. The deception topic is addressed
first since the logic of Soviet statements in the other areas appears
to rest in varying degreees on the assumption of deception. The topic
of the SDI's consequences is deferred until the later discussion of the
program's implications for Western Europe.
1 . The SDI Deception Campaign
The Soviet view of deception behind the SDI took two forms.
Implied deception pertained to the "true" nature of US political-
military objectives and the role of the SDI in furthering their
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achievement. The present discussion addresses overt references to
deception which, in the view of Soviet commentators, collectively
constituted a deliberate effort on the part of the United States to
deceive Western public opinion concerning the SDI:
"The implementation of this program (costing trillions of dollars)
needs the corresponding international and domestic public support
.
This is why the US Administration is using all the mass media and
setting its entire propaganda machine in motion in a vain attempt to
make the 'star wars' program, if not actually popular, then at least
attractive and, above all, at all costs to conceal the grim truth
about it from mankind. That is why the SDI apologists are making
more and new propaganda maneuvers in order to deceive the peoples."
[Ref. 48]«
The basis for the SDI "deception campaign" was the
Administration's contention that US motives for the program are essen-
tially peaceful and harmless. This position was challenged by vir-
tually all Soviet commentators:
"Without any substantiation and jeering at common sense, they pass
off the US President's plans to create an extensive antimissile
defense system as a 'peace-loving defensive measure,' as a 'guaran-
tee of security and hope for a peaceful future.* However, all
these epithets are only a deception of the public." [Ref. 49]**
Such a view was echoed, for example, by G. Arbatov, Director of
the Institute of United States and Canada Studies, USSR Academy of
Sciences:
"The US President is presenting the 'star wars' project to the public
as a weapon that will put an end to the nuclear threat and will lead
mankind to a paradise for all.... The impracticability of the project
in the form in which an attempt is being made to sell it to American
legislators as well as to the American public and the US's allies,
does not, however, make it any less dangerous." [Ref. 50] (Emphasis
added)
*Adm. A. Sorokin, First Deputy Chief of Staff, Soviet Army and Navy
Main Political Directorate.
**Col. Gen. N. Chervov , Soviet General Staff.
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Dr. Arbatov's reference to the "form" of the SDI is signifi-
cant. The Administration's primary persuasive arguments for the
program were initially centered on the "vision" of the total elimina-
tion of nuclear weapons. This argument was later supplemented with the
stated need to match or counter developments within Soviet offensive
and defensive forces and thus to correct an existing imbalance.
Finally, the SDI was offered as a means of compelling the Soviets to
engage in "serious" arms control negotiations that would ultimately
result in the USSR adopting its own version of the SDI. The aim of
Soviet "counter-deception" rhetoric was, first, to argue that the SDI
in its advertised form was unachievable, and hence, incapable of
accomplishing the Administration's stated objectives (thus opening the
question of actual US intentions for the SDI), and, second, to
discourage the idea that the SDI could somehow be useful as an instru-
ment of pressure against the Soviet Union.
The basic elements of Soviet reaction to the SDI on the topic
of deception are presented in Table 2. The Administration's case for
the SDI as a necessary response to Soviet military developments was
anticipated by CPSU General Secretary Andropov immediately following
the President's 23 March 1983 speech—well before this line of argument
was adopted as a major justification for the SDI:
"The importunate and profuse talk about how all this is being done in
response to the 'Soviet military threat,' no matter how often it is
repeated, should not mislead anyone. Nothing the Soviet Union has
done or is doing testifies in any way to a striving for military
superiority." [Ref. 51 :p. 4]
The theme that the SDI represented an unwarranted provocation
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tenures of Andropov and Chernenko. They generally took the form of
flat denials of any agressive intent behind Soviet strategic posture.
As the focus of Soviet media attention shifted to Western Europe,
references to US disinformation on the Soviet threat not only appeared
to increase in frequency but became more specific, particularly in
regard to Soviet strategic defense activities:
"It is not difficult to understand what is behind the fabrications of
the Pentagon and the US State Department claiming that the Soviet
Union has all but set up an ABM system for the country's territory.
This is deceiving the public....We do not have a program for deve-
loping space strike systems, and we have no 'star wars* plans analo-
gous to those of the Americans. The USSR is strictly fulfilling the
unlimited-duration ABM Treaty of 1972." [Ref. 52]*
Shortly after the President's 23 March 1983 speech, the Soviet
position on the feasibility of "total" strategic defense was voiced by
the scientific community:
"Based on the knowledge that we, as scientists, possess, and pro-
ceeding from our understanding of the very nature of nuclear weapons,
we declare most emphatically that there are no effective defensive
means in nuclear war and that their creation is virtually
impossible ... .Such 'defensive weapons' can give almost nothing to a
country that is protecting the overwhelming majority of the
population ." [Ref. 53] (Emphasis added)
In 1984, this view was elaborated upon by the Soviet Committee
for Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat. In a highly detailed and
technical report, the Committee cited the SDI's probable enormous cost
and extreme vulnerability to countermeasures as two reasons for conclu-
ding:
"The assertions coming from the Reagan Administration that the new
antimissile defense systems spell salvation from nuclear missiles for
mankind are perhaps the greatest ever deceptions of our time ." [Ref.
31 :p. 25] (Emphasis added)
•Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Akhromeyev, General Staff, USSR
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The main point underlying the Committee's evaluation of the SDI
was the continuing dominance of offensive nuclear weapons. The
resulting implication that mutual assured destruction remained the
basis for the Soviet-American strategic relationship was frankly
admitted by academician G. Arbatov:
"Whatever may be said, peace today is largely the result of
deterrence on both sides. It rests on the proposition that each
side is aware that if it started a nuclear war it would be sub-
jected to a devastating strike in return." [Ref. 54]
Given that total strategic defense against nuclear attack is
impossible, US hopes for a return to a condition of invulnerable
"fortress North America" were likewise in vain [Ref. 52].
As Table 2 shows, themes b. and c. received rather consistent
play in the Soviet media until the spring of 1985 and then abruptly
fell off. It may have been that these themes were found to be incon-
sistent with propaganda aimed at convincing the West European public
that the SDI was intended to protect only the United States.
Toward the end of Chernenko's tenure, Soviet claims that the
SDI represented more than exploratory research were heavily emphasized
(see Table 2). The military missions of the space shuttle and ASAT
tests were regularly identified with SDI research thus revealing the
propagandistic nature of such statements. Yet the US budgetary commit-
ment to the program combined with on-going and planned feasibility
demonstrations appeared to make an impression on the Soviets beyond
their propaganda exploitation potential. In the words of Secretary
General Gorbachev:
"We do not consider (SDI) to be a research program. In our opinion,
it is the first stage of a project to develop a new ABM system, which
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is prohibited by the relevant treaty of 1972. Just think of the
scale of it alone— the plan is to allocate $70 billion in the next
few years. This is an incredible amount for pure research, as is
emphasized by US scientists as well ... .That it is by no means a pure
research program is indicated by other facts as well, including the
tests that are scheduled for space strike weapons systems." [Ref.
55:p. 16]
Finally, the Administration's contention that the SDI could be
used to modify Soviet behavior in some way was characterized simply as
another aspect of the deception campaign. Though Soviet spokesmen
occasionally admitted that a countermeasures program would probably be
expensive, it would be less so than for the SDI program itself [Ref.
56]. In any case, Soviet discussion of the SDI's consequences
(presented below) was intended to signal the West that they would not
be intimidated by the SDI. More often than not, direct references to
the compellant aspects of the SDI were simply dismissed. Gorbachev
again:
"Apparently someone in the US thought there was an opportunity to
overtake us, to bring pressure on the Soviet Union. But this is an
illusion. It has not succeeded in the past, and it will not succeed
now." [Ref. 55:p. 21
]
To summarize, most of the overt references to deception were
couched in terms of its being perpetrated on US domestic and foreign
public opinion. In this vein, the Soviets came down squarely on that
side of Western opinion that discounts the technical feasibility of
total strategic defense that could eventually permit the abandonment of
nuclear weapons. While the Soviets themselves were not "fooled" by
such rhetoric, they seemed to be impressed by the skill and resources
of the US public relations effort and its potential effect on the anti-
nuclear movement [Ref. 57]. The depth of their concern over the SDI
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was perhaps best reflected by prominent Soviet spokesmen arguing in
favor of mutual deterrence through nuclear weapons. While such
admissions were admittedly rare, the Soviet leadership was undoubtedly
uncomfortable with finding itself on the "receiving end" of the disar-
mament issue.
2. US Intentions for the SDI
Soviet claims of a US campaign to deceive Western public opi-
nion centered on what the SDI is not : the SDI could not be intended to
achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons. As discussed above,
the Soviets stressed the argument that the state of defensive tech-
nology, now and in the future, would not permit abandonment of nuclear
weapons for deterrence. The implied aspect of deception behind the SDI
centered on what the SDI is: a means by which the United States could
acquire the capability for achieving a preemptive first strike against
the Soviet Union. This contention was established early-on by CPSU
General Secretary Andropov and became a consistent theme in Soviet com-
mentary (see Table 3):
"At first glance, (the SDI) may even seem attractive to uninformed
people—after all, the President is talking about what seem to be
defensive measures. But it seems so only at first glance, and only
to those who are unfamiliar with these matters. In fact, the deve-
lopment and improvement of the US's strategic offensive forces will
continue at full speed, and in a very specific direction—that of
acquiring the potential to deliver a nuclear first strike. In
these conditions, the intention to obtain the possibility of
destroying, with the help of antimissile defense, the corresponding
strategic systems of the other side—i.e., of depriving it of the
capability of inflicting a retaliatory strike—is designed to disarm
the Soviet Union in the face of the American nuclear threat." [Ref.
51:p. 5]
Soviet claims of US intent to obtain a first-strike capabi-
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that a first-strike strategy constituted an integral feature of the
Flexible Response doctrine [Ref. 47:p. 59]. This theme was invoked
again in the 1970s with the announcement of "limited nuclear options"
[Ref. 43:p. 151]. More recently, the deployment of PERSHING II missi-
les in Western Europe was denounced by the Soviets as another mani-
festation of a US preemptive-strike doctrine [Ref. 58 :p. 13 ].
The question of whether the Soviets actually believed their own
propaganda is debatable given the evident absence of a first-strike
capability to accompany purported US doctrine. But once again the
Soviets professed to see evidence of efforts by the United States to
acquire such a capability in elements of the Strategic Modernization
Program and "stealth" aircraft as well as the INF:
"The facts prove that the present administration certainly is not
thinking about 'defense. 1 On the contrary, it is putting its hopes
on acquiring the potential for a disabling nuclear first strike.
To this end, the accuracy of American nuclear systems capable of
hitting our retaliatory strike forces
—
primarily silo launchers for
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)— is being improved.
Conditions are created for a surprise nuclear attack using the
Pershing II missiles that are being placed in West European
countries, as well as the long-range cruise missiles in various
basing modes that are being deployed close to USSR territory.
Various methods are being used to camouflage American missiles and
bombers in flight so as to minimize the possibility of their
detection." [Ref. 59:p. 7]*
The essential Soviet positions on the deceptive versus actual
US intentions for the SDI appear to be contradictory in some respects.
On the one hand, the Soviets insist that the fundamental advantage of
offensive over defensive technologies makes the goal of assuring the
survival of American society infeasible. On the other hand, the




Soviets appear to be deeply concerned that the SDI, in combination with
the US strategic and INF force modernization programs, constitute a
grave threat to the Soviet Union. The Soviets resolve this incon-
sistency by concluding that the SDI need not provide an impenetrable
defense in order to be militarily useful . The fact that the
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment came to essentially the
same conclusion [Ref. 60:p. 47], along with comments of US officials
on the advantages of "limited defense," tended to reinforce the Soviet
view of deception. The Soviet military journal Krasnaya Zvezda puts it
this way:
"The White house, despite tremendous efforts, did not succeed in
halting what was literally an avalanche of testimony from high-
ranking officials to the effect that it is possible to create
only a 'limited' ABM defense. General Abrahamson , responsible for
fulfilling the 'strategic defense initiative, 1 began to cite as an
argument in favor of creating this ABM defense its 25 percent or
even 50 percent efficiency. On the basis of these admissions the US
press noted that this approach refutes publicity ploys regarding
the creation of a system designed to 'defend population centers
and render nuclear weapons obsolete ' ... .Thus there was revealed the
unseemly picture that the Washington Post accurately described as
deception—deception geared to misleading millions of Americans in
order to seek approval for a sinister design: securing for offen-
sive nuclear weapons a 'space shield' under the cover of which it
would be possible to attempt, while counting on impunity, to use
these weapons for a surprise first strike." [Ref. 61] (Emphasis
added)
The Soviet military's contention that the SDI is intended for
purposes other than those claimed by the Administration was obviously
shared by the party leadership as indicated in these comments by CPSU
General Secretary Gorbachev:
"We cannot take seriously the assertions that SDI would guarantee
invulnerability from nuclear attack systems, thereby leading to the
elimination of nuclear weapons. In the opinion of our specialists
(and, to my knowledge, of many of yours), this is an unrealizable
fantasy, an empty dream. But even on the much more modest scale
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in whioh SDI, according to specialists, is practicable, it is very
dangerous ." [Ref. 55:p. 16] (Emphasis added)
The Soviet view of the SDI in a limited defense role was con-
sistent with their perception of US strategic doctrine which seeks to
control escalation and limit damage to the United States through
selected counterforce strikes against Soviet ICBM fields and other
military targets.
The following statement by Doctor of Historical Sciences A.
Kokoshin indicates that the Soviets correctly perceived that US
targeting strategy is not oriented toward assured destruction (except
as a last resort) and the SDI's potential for making actual US strategy
more effective:
"US strategists envisage an exchange of strikes against ICBM launch
silos without harm to industrial installations or administrative cen-
ters and without losses of its population. They also envisage a sce -
nario in which a first strike is delivered against such silos with
impunity. After all, they say, the 'ABM shield' will do its work and
limit the counterstrike . Soviet military doctrine rejects the idea
of 'limited' nuclear war and of waging it 'according to rules' as
illusory and exceptionally dangerous." [Ref. 62] (Emphasis added)
The Soviets also attempted to portray the SDI as inherently
aggressive in its own right, that is, even without its association with
nuclear weapons. References to "space strike" weapons capable of
destroying targets other than ballistic missiles on the ground, as well
as in the air and at sea, received relatively minor attention in the
Soviet media except during the latter half of the Chernenko period (see
Table 3). This surge may have been part of a Soviet effort to propa-
gandize their proposal at the United Nations in September 1984 for a
"ban on the use of force in space and from space against the earth, as
well as from earth against objects in space" [Ref. 63 :p. 4].
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In the opinion of some scientists in the United States, the
possibility exists that the SDI could be employed offensively against
some types of "soft" ground targets and ultimately against "hard"
targets as well in a first-strike mode [Ref. 33:p. 1]« Once again,
spokesman for the Soviet academic-scientific community adopted or, more
precisely, co-opted this theme as a means of demonstrating the
Administration's militaristic intent [Ref. 64]. This view also was
echoed in comments by CPSU General Secretary Chernenko:
"It is clear from plans announced in the US that it is intended to
deploy antimissile systems in space, to give free range to the opera-
tion of various kinds of antisatellite systems, and to deploy
ultranew types of weapons designed to strike targets on the earth,
in the air, and at sea ." [Ref. 65] (Emphasis added)
The SDI's possible implications for the ABM Treaty was imme-
diately apparent to the Soviets both as a threat to the treaty's con-
tinued viability and, because of this, the SDI's utility as a
propaganda theme. The intention of the United States to breach the ABM
Treaty received consistently high play in the Soviet media (as shown in
Table 3). The character of Soviet claims changed over time, however,
with earlier commentary tending to focus on the SDI's impact on the
treaty following a future deployment decision:
"Certain actions of the US with respect to the unlimited duration
Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile (ABM) systems can-
not fail to cause concern, and the USSR has repeatedly addressed
the American side on this matter ... .For what purpose is the US
developing ABM systems that, in the event of their deployment
,
would go beyond the framework permitted by the treaty and, in
effect, would lead to its undermining? After all, it was exactly
plans for the creation of such a large-scale ABM system that the
American side officially announced in March 1983." [Ref. 66]
(Emphasis added)
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Later Soviet references to US violations of the ABM Treaty and
others were oriented more to the present tense [Ref. 67] and were
increasingly related to claims that the SDI was not merely a research
program. The reasons for this change in emphasis probably related to
the perceived need to counter increasing US stress on Soviet treaty
violations and to the increasing utility of the ABM Treaty as a propa-
ganda device as the focus of the SDI debate shifted to Western Europe.
In short, the Soviets attempted to portray actual US intentions
for the SDI as being something quite different from those stated by the
Administration. In the Soviet view, technological constraints made the
prospects of achieving "assured survival" objectively unattainable.
Therefore, the stated US intention of pursuing total, i.e., population,
defense for the United States (and NATO Europe) was nothing more than
deception through propaganda. However, the technical feasibility of
protecting limited numbers of targets was borne out by Soviet
experience and "informed" Western opinion both inside and outside of
government. Thus, actual US intentions for the SDI are centered on
acquiring a military advantage over the Soviet Union which, in turn,
implies deception.
The nature of the US advantage from the Soviet perspective was
cast in typically "worst-case" terms, namely that of placing the United
States in a position to launch a first strike. Such a view was by no
means new to Soviet propaganda directed against US strategic doctrine
and military programs. What was new was that the SDI, deployed for
limited defense of military targets in combination with modernized
strategic and theater offensive forces, could be seen as closing the
71
gap between purported US strategy and the capabilities required to exe-
cute that strategy. In this regard, it could be said that the gap bet-
ween Soviet propaganda and actual perceptions was also closing.
3. The Objectives of US Political-Military Strategy
As the actual US intentions for the SDI were seen by the
Soviets as being consistent with US strategic doctrine, so was the
latter perceived as advancing the achievement of US political-military
objectives. The ultimate objective of US strategy, in the view of the
party, was proclaimed by CPSU General Secretary Andropov within days of
the President's 23 March 1983 speech: "After all, the whole point of
the speech is that America should arm itself faster and become the
dominant military power in the world" [Ref. 51 :p. 4].
Andropov's reference to "military dominance" as a prime objec-
tive of US strategy did not originate with the SDI. This theme has
been more or less constantly present in Soviet propaganda over the
years [Ref. 47:p. 55]. It received particular emphasis in Soviet com-
mentary on INF modernization [Ref. 58:p. 12] and, as Table M indica-
tes, the military dominance theme received a great deal of attention in
reference to the SDI. The media's apparent deemphasis on this theme
after Gorbachev's assumption of power could be due to the predominance
of other themes more pertinent to Soviet propaganda objectives in
Western Europe. Nevertheless, the role of the SDI in furthering US
strategic objectives, particularly as the US rationale for the program
increasingly stressed its relationship to Soviet strategic develop-
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"A comparison between the President's March (1983) statement and his
Saturday radio address reveals a radical shift of accents in 'star
wars' advertising. The former proclaims the 'aim* of making nuclear
weapons 'impotent' and 'obsolete.' The latter does not even mention
that. It turns out that the aim is to counterpose the US' own
measures to Soviet threats and strategic challenges ... . The true
objective of the plans and actions by the present administration
is to obtain strategic superiority with the help of the so-called
program of 'rearming America' and developing new types of
armaments—strike space weapons." [Ref. 68] (Emphasis added)
Perhaps not surprisingly, it is the political implications of
the SDI in furthering US strategic objectives that appeared to be of
most concern to party officials and commentators. This is indicated by
the relative lack of emphasis on the SDI's contribution to US war-
fighting potential (theme d., Table 4).
Shultz's and Godson's analysis of Soviet propaganda during the
1960-1980 period revealed that the party apparently did not perceive
any direct threat or challenge to Soviet security interests emanating
from alleged US aggressiveness or militarism [Ref. 47:p. 101].
Likewise in the case of the SDI, the potential military threat, though
real enough, was neither as immediate nor damaging in the long term as
the potential threat to the achievement of Soviet foreign policy objec-
tives. In other words, the Soviet leadership was as much concerned
with what the Soviet Union stood to lose as with what the United States
might gain through military dominance. Consider the words of former
Defense Minister Ustinov:
"The course of imperialist reaction, headed by US ruling circles,
became especially aggressive as the 1980s began.... The US's and
NATO's intentions to deploy new American medium-range nuclear
missiles in Western Europe as first-strike weapons pose a special
danger. No less dangerous is the Reagan Administration's plan to
develop means of waging war in outer space. And all this is being
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done in order to establish world domination, to erect a barrier on
the path of progressive changes in the world ." [Ref. 69] (Emphasis
added
)
From the Soviet point of view, it was the establishment of
strategic parity in the 1970s that created the conditions for
"progressive changes" in the Third World and, in certain respects, in
Western Europe. The Soviets define parity as the relative equality
derived from the sum of quantitative and qualitative inequalities
existing between the forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. As long as
each side retains a secure second-strike capability, parity is pre-
served [Ref. 70]. It is precisely this "equilibrium" that the Reagan
Administration seeks to disrupt, in part, through the SDI (see Table
4). The party's assessment of the political-military motivation for
the SDI was expressed by V. Falin , former First Deputy of the Central
Committee's International Department:
"In May 1982, reports appeared that the United States was adopting a
policy of 'devaluing' the Soviet military potential . This is very
important—not the maintenance of equilibrium, nor identical
security, but precisely 'devaluation, 1 by deploying nuclear and
non-nuclear first-strike systems and creating techniques for the
preemptive destruction of the enemy's strategic
means ... .Consequently , Reagan's March 1 983 statement on the construc-
tion of an 'impenetrable shield' against nuclear missiles merely
dotted the 'i's in the sense of making the final choice of politi-
cal guidelines and concluding the debate within the Administration
itself. Let's go into space, the President decided." [Ref. 71]
(Emphasis added)
In other words, the objective of the SDI, in conjunction with
other US military programs, is to erode the primary basis of Soviet
global strategy—military power.
In a more purely propaganda vein, the Soviets attempted to
portray themselves as sincerely interested in halting the arms race
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while the objective of the United States was to obstruct the arms
control process. Soviet references to US opposition to negotiations in
particular and detente in general became more pronounced in the late
1970s as the neutron bomb and INF modernization were being debated in
the West [Ref. 47:p. 55]. Following the NATO "dual track" decision of
December 1979, the theme of US disinterest in arms control was promi-
nent in the Soviet campaign to prevent INF deployment [Ref. 58 :p. 18]
and quickly became a major feature of propaganda directed at the SDI
after March 1983. As indicated in Table 4, this theme appeared to peak
in the early months of Chernenko's tenure. This was due in part to
Soviet efforts to absolve themselves of any responsibility for the
breakdown of the INF talks in late 1983 and to draw a parallel between
this event and US "intransigence" on the issue of space weapons talks
as the following TASS statement clearly reflects:
"Thus, the American administration has again demonstrated in no
uncertain terms that it does not intend to renounce its mili-
taristic course or the stepped-up implementation of broad-scale
military programs. It is evident that the very possibility of
serious talks on arms limitation is perceived in Washington as an
obstacle to the realization of such a policy. First, the US
wrecked the talks on nuclear arms in Geneva, and now it is making
the beginning of talks on space impossible ." [Ref. 72] (Emphasis
added)
The "proof" of the Reagan Administration's unwillingness to
engage in negotiations to prevent the "militarization of space" was
revealed by its negative response to a variety of Soviet initiatives
including the draft Treaty Prohibiting the Use of Force in Outer
Space and from Space toward Earth [Ref. 73 3 and their call for an
agreement on the dismantling of existing antisatellite systems and a
ban on the creation of new ones [Ref. 74] (in August 1983); the
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proposal for space weapons talks [Ref. 75] and the call for a mutual
moratorium on the testing and deployment of space strike systems [Ref.
76] (in June 1984); and the proposal for a Ban on the Use of Force in
Space and from Space against the Earth, as well as from Earth against
Objects in Space [Ref. 63 :p. 4] (in September 1984). Questions posed
by the United States Government in response to the Soviet proposals
concerning, among other things, the vagueness of language and the lack
of attention to the issue of verification were cited by the Soviets as
further evidence of the Administration's "obstructionist" attitude
toward arms control
.
Shortly after the resumption of arms control talks in Geneva in
March 1985 (the initiation of which the Soviets assumed full credit),
charges of "inflexibility" were once again leveled at the United States
[Ref. 77]. Specifically, the US was accused of attempting to use the
talks as a means of "legalizing" the arms race whereas the Soviet aim
was to prevent such a race [Ref. 78]. This claim was made in reference
to arguments by the Administration that SDI research was within the
framework of the ABM Treaty. As to the US position on the non-
negotiability of the SDI during the research phase, the following
statement by CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev provides an indication of
the Soviet appraisal of the Administration's uncompromising attitude:
"Washington is stating with utter frankness: No matter what the
Soviet Union does at Geneva or in the military field, the US in any
case will develop space strike weapons and antisatellite systems."
[Ref. 55:p. 20]
In summary, a significant portion of Soviet commentary on the
SDI was intended to emphasize the program's role in US political-
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military strategy. Some of the assertions on the nature of US objec-
tives in the SDI context were virtually indistinguishable from those
appearing in earlier Soviet propaganda campaigns. Yet to the extent
that the SDI could be seen as contributing to the enhancement of
current US strategy, as opposed to creating the conditions for movement
to a new (defensive) strategy, Soviet assertions of an attempt by the
United States to derive military, and hence political, advantage
through the SDI appear to be more than mere propaganda.
4 . Interpreting the Soviet Response: The SDI as a Threat
Soviet public statements clearly reflect a high degree of
anxiety over the implications of the SDI. Included among the SDI's
dangerous consequences are a renewed arms race, international instabi-
lity, and the increased risk of war. As will be discussed below, such
outcomes tend to parallel the debate in the West and are thoroughly
exploited for their propaganda effect particularly in Western Europe.
However, much less is revealed concerning the threat posed by the SDI
to Soviet strategic programs and objectives from the latter's perspec-
tive. An attempt will be made here to infer from the foregoing
discussion the Soviet view of the threat in terms of the SDI's poten-
tial contribution to current US strategic doctrine.
The Administration's stated goal for the SDI is that the early
stages of deployment should make the existing US deterrent strategy
more effective, while later stages would allow movement to a different
strategy [Ref. 60 :p. 25]. This position could be interpreted in two
ways depending upon one's understanding of "current US strategy" and
both would be correct.
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One interpretation pertains to the US declaratory doctrine of
"assured destruction" which the Administration has vowed to replace
with "assured survival" based on the SDI . The other interpretation
concerns the actual US "countervailing strategy" and its underlying
doctrine of Flexible Response which together envision the employment of
nuclear weapons in ways that are both militarily and politically
useful. From the Soviet point of view, it is the SDI's role in
reinforcing the latter "war-fighting" aspect of US strategy that is of
prime concern
.
The public debate surrounding the SDI has tended to overlook
two "myths" of US strategic doctrine. One myth is that mutual assured
destruction is the basis of US nuclear planning [Ref. 79 :p. 54]. It
is widely believed that in the event of Soviet attack at any level of
conflict the immediate US response would be rather large-scale nuclear
retaliation against Soviet urban-industrial (countervalue) targets.
The other, and related, myth is contained within the US-NATO doctrine
of Flexible Response which holds that in the event of Soviet conven-
tional attack against Western Europe, NATO will take the initiative in
going nuclear [Ref. 80].
The reality is that, in the first instance, US vulnerability to
Soviet attack has forced the search for alternatives that would control
escalation and thereby limit damage to the United States and the
allies. The goal of US strategic doctrine has been to make MAD the
last resort outcome, rather than the initial phase, of a nuclear
exchange with the Soviet Union. In the second instance, the very fact
of US vulnerability has made the prospect of nuclear retaliation
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against a Soviet attack limited to Western Europe less and less cre-
dible as a deterrent. The challenge confronting US strategic planners
has been to restore the military and political utility of nuclear
weapons both as a deterrent and as a means of controlling escalation if
deterrence failed in the face of Soviet efforts to restrict the United
States to an increasingly incredible assured destruction posture. The
objective, in other words, has been to restore some measure of
"flexibility" to the doctrine of Flexible Response.
As the momentum of the Soviet strategic buildup showed no sign
of slackening either during or after the SALT I negotiations, it became
increasingly apparent that the shift in the strategic balance had
decreased the damage-limiting capability of US strategic forces [Ref.
42:p. 115]. The United States could neither disarm the Soviet Union
nor could it, through a combination of offensive and defensive means,
significantly limit damage to itself in an all-out nuclear war [Ref.
79 :p. 77]. The President was thus faced with three choices: (1)
authorize strikes (preemptive or retaliatory) against Soviet forces
that would probably weaken the US more than the USSR; (2) unleash a
massive assured destruction strike on all targets, military and urban-
industral; or (3) do nothing [Ref. 79:p- 76].
In the view of Defense Secretary Schlesinger, the President
needed to be able to contemplate some kind of purely "military"
exchange—selected strikes against military targets—and yet still be
able to rely on his reserve "second-strike" against civilian targets
[Ref. 81]. Thus, the Schlesinger Doctrine (1974) envisioned the
creation of smaller attack options that would increase the flexibility
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of existing war plans. In the event deterrence failed, the primary US
objective was to control the process of escalation, bringing hostili-
ties to an acceptable close at the lowest level of conflict possible,
thereby limiting the damage to the United States and its allies. If
necessary, escalation control and damage limitation were to be achieved
through the use of limited nuclear options (LNOs). These options would
serve both a military and political purpose. If escalation control
failed, the United States would seek to destroy Soviet military, poli-
tical, and economic assets so as to retard the USSR's recovery in the
postwar period. Such attacks would also be designed to limit the
Soviet Union's ability to retard US recovery [Ref. 79:p. 80].
In 1980, United States attack options were further refined in
Presidential Directive 59 (PD 59) with emphasis on targeting facilities
which the Soviet leadership deemed essential to a successful war
effort, that is, targets that comprise the Soviet military force struc-
ture and political power structure [Ref. 79:p. 82].
US strategic doctrine had thus evolved from a condition of
almost complete reliance on assured destruction to a relatively greater
emphasis on the credible use of nuclear weapons as the basis for
deterrence. Yet the continuing (and growing) vulnerability of the ICBM
(counterforce) leg of the US strategic triad to a Soviet preemptive
strike degraded the potential for exercising LNOs as a means of
controlling the escalatory process [Ref. 82].
With the growth of opinion in the United States that the SDI's
promise for providing near-perfect defense against a massive Soviet
attack was virtually hopeless (though officially this remains the SDI's
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ultimate goal), the debate shifted to the program's utility in a less-
than-near-perfect defense, i.e., in shoring up the war-fighting aspect
of US strategic doctrine [Ref. 83]. The increasing emphasis on the
SDI's near- and mid-term counter-counterforce role (and corresponding
decrease in the long-term goal of "assured survival") is reflected in
the remarks of Defense Secretary Weinberger:
"If the Soviets ever contemplated initiating a nuclear attack, their
purpose would be to destroy US or allied retaliatory capability and
the military forces that would blunt Soviet aggression. Even par-
tially efffective defenses that could deny Soviet missiles their
military objectives or shake the Soviets' confidence in their ability
to achieve such dire objectives would discourage them from con-
sidering such an attack and thus be a highly effective deterrent."
[Ref. 84]
Such reasoning is entirely consistent with current US
"countervailing strategy" embodied in PD 59 that attempts to deter the
Soviet Union from nuclear attack or threat of attack on the United
States or its allies by persuading the Soviets that US nuclear coun-
terattacks would, primarily, lead to unacceptable damage to valued
Soviet assets (punishment), and, secondarily, would cause such Soviet
attacks to fail in their geopolitical objectives (denial) [Ref. 60:p.
25].
The SDI debate, then, no longer centered on the question of
protecting American cities perfectly but on improving deterrence
through a mix of offensive and defensive forces [Ref. 85]. Advocates
of the SDI's limited deployment role argued that the nature of a Soviet
attack would most likely involve limited strikes against US military
targets under the assumption that the Soviets also have an interest in
avoiding national suicide [Ref. 86]. Defense against such an attack
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would not only not have to be perfect to be useful as a deterrent but,
by enhancing the survivability of US ICBMs, would preserve the strate-
gic options available to the President [Ref. 87].
The Soviets saw American plans for more selective use of
strategic weapons (LNOs and PD 59) as an indication that the United
States was trying to escape the restrictions of "parity" and to restore
political utility to its strategic forces [Ref. 88:p. 50]. Indeed,
they appeared to perceive LNOs as a move toward a preemptive, war-
fighting strategy similar to their own. The Soviets viewed theirs
as the only truly rational, objective, and scientific doctrine.
Assuming the Soviet perception of American planners as rational, it
followed that the United States was considering a similar doctrine for
its own use. Deterrence, moreover, was not considered to be incon-
sistent with a war-fighting capability. In the Soviet view, what could
deter more effectively than an imposing offensive arsenal backed up by
the best possible active and passive defense? [Ref. 40:p. 11]
Since LNOs incorporated certain aspects of nuclear war-
fighting, the Soviets looked for the United States to start bolstering
its strategic defenses so as to obtain a credible war-survival capabi-
lity. When no such thing happened, LNOs lost credibility [Ref. 43:p.
152]. Similar motives were imputed to the "countervailing strategy,"
i.e., an attempt by the United States to achieve superiority through
LNOs and through the qualitiative improvement of nuclear forces, for
example, by improving the accuracy of ballistic missiles. But PD 59
was not credible, again, because the United States was too vulnerable
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to rationally threaten the Soviet Union with even highly selective nuclear
attack [Ref. 43:p. 163].
In their propaganda, the Soviets denounced limited nuclear war
concepts as US contrivances to make nuclear weapons use more
"acceptable" and to rationalize the quest for counterforce advantages
[Ref. 89]. The Soviets have also acknowledged and criticized the SDI's
relationship to US limited war concepts [Ref. 90]. As discussed
earlier, this criticism has assumed typical "worst-case" form: the
intention of the United States to provide a shield for first-strike
offensive weapons.
Notwithstanding the obvious propaganda intent of such state-
ments, the Soviets are clearly haunted by a "nightmare scenario" in
which the United States beats them to the defensive punch and combines
the SDI with on-going offensive improvements to gain real nuclear
superiority [Ref. 91.'p. 86]. At the very least, the SDI is seen as
but one element (perhaps not wholly unexpected) in current strategic
trends that cause Soviet defense planners to worry about the erosion of
their war-fighting options, and hence by Soviet definition, the
weakening of deterrence [Ref. 91."p. 102].
On the other hand, the relative lack of emphasis in Soviet com-
mentary on the capability to win a nuclear war as an objective of US
political-military strategy, partly by means of the SDI, is a reflec-
tion of their concern for the program's utility under conditions other
than the "nightmare scenario." Specifically, it is the SDI's potential
for restoring credibility to the war-fighting aspect of US strategic
doctrine (and, by extension, to NATO's doctrine of Flexible Response)
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that is more worrisome to the party leadership. As has been
demonstrated in the past, the party will view any attempt by the United
States to improve its military position, particularly if it entails
movement away from an assured destruction posture, as being detrimental
to the political advantages the Soviet Union has enjoyed by virtue of
its military policies particularly with regard to Western Europe.
Three major strategic goals have shaped the evolution of Soviet
defense policy. One is the necessity to provide robust deterrence
against any military operations against the USSR and its allies.
Another is the maintenance of a military doctrine and force structure
that theoretically enables the Soviet Union to prevail in any type of
conflict. The third goal, which derives from the second, is the abi-
lity to maximize the political leverage provided by Soviet force
posture and doctrine while denying the same to their opponents. [Ref.
91 :p. 87]
Ideally, the Soviets would prefer to achieve their political
objectives peacefully, that is, to gain the fruits of war without
having to resort to war in the first place. Thus, in the opinion of
some analysts, the political goals of Soviet military strategy assume
crucial importance:
"The main purpose of the Soviet military buildup in Europe is not
first to prepare for and then fight war, conventional or nuclear, but
to influence Western perceptions. It is to change the psychology of
Western European and American public opinion and political
leadership. It is to maintain and enhance, rather than alleviate,
Western insecurity; to create an atmosphere in which the first use of
nuclear weapons by NATO is seen as militarily counterproductive and
morally reprehensible; and to convey the impression that Western
Europe cannot and therefore, will not be defended." [Ref. 92 :p.
95] (Emphasis in original)
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The Soviet Union has thus sought to capitalize on the politico-
psychological benefits of the appearance of superiority, or at least
equality [Ref. M0:p. 5]. Indeed, the Soviet view of the "balance" in
Europe indicates a belief in the continued and even increasing utility
of manifestations of preponderant power [Ref. 81]. The image of Soviet
power, moreover, is reinforced by a military doctrine that emphasizes a
willingness to use that power should the need arise.
The Soviet predilection for war-fighting as opposed to
deterrent capabilities has long been cited as a key aspect of their
military doctrine. Actually, as stated earlier, such a distinction is
a false dichotomy since the terms are not necessarily mutually exclu-
sive. Even in the West there are those who believe that the most cre-
dible form of deterrent would be a capability to fight and win a war if
necessary [Ref. 93 :p. 270].
Beyond its utility for deterrence, however, the Soviet emphasis
on war-fighting is also designed to maximize the political effect of
military capabilities. The adoption of a purely deterrent or defensive
posture would have a minimal political effect, or none at all [Ref.
92 :p. 94]. Thus, the notion of "limited" nuclear war, apparently pre-
ferred by the United States, was undermined by Soviet assertions of the
unavoidable escalation of any war between the superpowers . An image
was offered of an all-out conflict opening with massive nuclear
exchanges in which few cities would escape unscathed [Ref. 93:p« 266].
The declared Soviet willingness to engage in such a conflict,
"if unleashed by the imperialists," does not mean the Soviet leadership
believes that it can fight and "win" a nuclear war. Rather, it is part
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of an effort to exploit US-NATO over-reliance on nuclear weapons. The
combined effect of Soviet offensive doctrine backed up by the threat of
escalation dominance at every level of the arms competition has been to
create concern on the part of Western public opinion and political
leadership (especially in Western Europe) that the link provided by
Flexible Response between conventional and nuclear war, as well as bet-
ween war in Europe and general war, has been weakened and can be broken
altogether. [Ref. 92:p. 95]
Soviet policy has thus aimed to destroy the credibility of
US-NATO strategy thereby providing the USSR with a military and politi-
cal advantage in its relations with Western Europe. References in
Soviet commentary to efforts by the United States to achieve military
dominance, in part through the SDI, take on a new meaning when seen in
this light.
The most worrisome aspect of the SDI from the perspective of
the party leadership is not so much the potential military threat
though such is obviously a serious long-term consideration. More com-
pelling is the prospect of the SDI's contribution to the "devaluation"
of Soviet military power and the consequent neutralization of political
leverage which the Soviets have sought to cultivate through the
appearance of superiority. In other words, to the extent that the SDI
makes current NATO strategy more effective, the political benefits of
Soviet strategy are proportionately reduced. In short, what has been
taking place between the United States and the Soviet Union is not only
a competition in arms but, perhaps more importantly, a competition in
strategies [Ref. 88 :p. 72].
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The SDI's potential for providing the United States with margi-
nal advantages in this competition is the basis for the Soviet view of
deception behind the program. Deception, by definition, is the deli-
berate misrepresentation of reality done to gain a competitive advan-
tage [Ref. 25 :p. 3]« In their commentary, the Soviets have provided
direct and indirect indications of their belief that the actual
rationale for the SDI is to improve the US' strategic position vis-a-
vis the USSR to the latter's disadvantage. This belief is reinforced
by Soviet preconceptions regarding the continuing dominance of offen-
sive over defensive technology; the limited though useful role that
defensive weapons play even under conditions of offensive dominance;
the probable superiority of a US defensive system regardless of its
deployment configuration; and the likely unwillingness of the United
States to forego this advantage once it has been achieved.
The Soviets dismiss the Administration's contention that the
SDI is intended to enhance current US strategy on the way to creating
the conditions that will allow the transition to a new strategy. On
the contrary, they seem convinced that on technical, military, and
strategic grounds such a transition will never take place. Therefore,
the Soviet characterization of "assured survival" through the SDI as
deception probably reflects their actual belief whether the intent is
to deceive Western opinion or the Soviets themselves.
B. SDI IN THE CONTEXT OF WESTERN EUROPE
As 1985 approached, Soviet commentary on the SDI increasingly
focused on the program's relationship to Western Europe. This is not
to say that the European context was neglected in the two years
following the SDI's announcement. Actually, references to the SDI's
implications for Europe increased during Chernenko's tenure. But there
was also a subtle message for the Europeans in some of the themes that
were apparently directed toward the United States. Both aspects of the
Soviet response will be presented below. As a prelude to this
discussion, the European reaction to the SDI will be addressed first.
Since the early 1950s, NATO strategy has revolved around the dual
requirement of deterring a Soviet nuclear or conventional attack on
Western Europe and, if deterrence failed, defeating the attack on terms
favorable to the allies. Throughout the post-war period it has been
the deterrent aspect of alliance strategy that has received the most
attention, with nuclear weapons at the center of that strategy.
The rationale for NATO reliance on the nuclear deterrent has not
significantly changed over the years; it is derived essentially from
the costs (political and economic) entailed in a shift to a strategy on
any other basis. Alliance strategy also involves the belief, par-
ticularly among the Europeans, that "victory" in Europe would be
meaningless because of the destruction of their homelands that would
result from the defeat of the attacker.
The problem for NATO has been one of maintaining the credibility of
its deterrent strategy in the context of domestic and intra-alliance
political constraints, and in the face of the evolving and more ominous
Soviet threat. The source of the problem is the changing nature of the
threat and differing perceptions of both sides of the Atlantic on the
best measures to deter or defeat it.
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The Flexible Response doctrine was adopted by NATO in 1 967 with the
aim of bolstering deterrence by providing a political incentive to the
Soviet Union to refrain from attacking, and to provide the means for
early termination of a war should deterrence fail. Its viability
depended upon maintaining the credibility of the triad which together
provide the doctrine's foundation: the US strategic deterrent;
European national and allied theater nuclear forces; and conventional
forces in Europe. As time passed, it became increasingly clear that an
imbalance in one or more of the components threatened to subvert the
credibility of the doctrine as a whole. It was precisely this
situation that the Soviets sought to create through an across-the-board
military buildup beginning in the early years of the Brezhnev regime.
In the presence of the growing Soviet threat, the basic tensions
between the United States and European interpretations of Flexible
Response were exacerbated. Generally, this has involved US efforts to
raise the nuclear threshold by limiting the potential use of nuclear
weapons to carefully defined military target sets in the hope of
controlling the escalation process. In this way, the credibility of
the actual use of these weapons is presumably reinforced and deterrence
is thereby enhanced. The Europeans, on the other hand, refuse to
contemplate any role for nuclear weapons except in their capacity as a
deterrent. Particular stress is placed on the massive first use of the
British and French independent nuclear forces. By emphasizing
uncontrolled escalation to the level of the US strategic component of




The SDI has been offered by the Reagan Administration as a poten-
tial solution to the declining credibility of NATO's deterrent strategy
because it could be used to reinforce the US strategic leg of the NATO
triad. But rather than reassuring the allies, the effect has been to
aggravate long-standing European concerns over the implications of
ballistic missile defense for European security. Such concerns provide
the Soviet Union with additional opportunities for exploiting divergen-
ces of interest between the United States and NATO Europe.
1 . The European Reaction to the SDI
Western Europe's initial reaction to the President's March 1 983
speech was a combination of surprise followed by consternation, con-
fusion, and misgivings. With apparently the sole exception of Prime
Minister Thatcher of Britain, no allied leaders were informed in
advance of the speech's ballistic missile defense theme [Ref. 9^:p.
112]. The general European reaction ranged from one of perplexed
puzzlement to undisguised anger over the lack of consultations. This
applied to the British as well since "informing" Mrs. Thatcher as to
the contents of the speech did not equate to discussing its implica-
tions. State Department officials later confirmed that there were no
previous consultations with the allies, and in fact officials at the
highest levels of the Department itself were informed of the contents
of the speech only hours before it was delivered [Ref. 95:p. 27].
The reaction of surprise to the SDI speech was accompanied by
amazement as to the breadth of the President's goals: "Rendering these
nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete" and "eliminating the threat
posed by strategic nuclear missiles." In Europe as eleswhere the
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feasibility of constructing leak-proof comprehensive defenses struck
many as being technologically naive. The European governments also
found the insinuation that NATO strategy is immoral to be badly timed,
considering their efforts to defend that strategy and to justify the
impending deployment of new US nuclear missiles in Europe. [Ref. 94 :p.
113]
Finally, the Europeans indicated a nearly reflexive fear of the
initiation of a new arms race. There was considerable concern that the
Soviet Union would intensify its own BMD activities and prepare
improved countermeasures to penetrate and overcome projected US BMD
capabilities [Ref. 94:p. 113 3- Also, the British and French were
unhappy with the possible impact on their independent nuclear
deterrents .
The fundamental elements of European concern over the SDI can
be traced back to alliance BMD deliberations of the late-1960s.
Defense Secretary McNamara's September 1967 speech announcing the deci-
sion to deploy the SENTINEL ABM system for defense against projected
Chinese strategic capabilities was not favorably received in Europe.
The Europeans feared that strategic stability and prospects for arms
control and detente would be needlessly endangered by highly expensive
technology that probably would not be reliably effective. It was
argued that even a limited defense (of ICBMs) might lead to area
defense and thus to a virtual "decoupling" of the US security guaran-
tee, as well as to the erosion of the European nuclear deterrents as a
result of Soviet BMD counterdeployments . The Europeans also believed
that BMD was naturally oriented toward fighting wars rather than toward
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their prevention, and as such was inherently inimical to European
security. Additionally, the announcement of SENTINEL was seen as
having been made without adequate allied consultation, which stimulated
suspicion of American tendencies to subordinate European security
interests to those of the United States. [Ref. 96:p. 144]
In 1969, the Nixon Administration decided to revise the
anti-Chinese orientation of SENTINEL to a SAFEGUARD system dedicated
primarily to protection of US retaliatory forces, and secondarily
against accidental or small attacks by the Soviets or the Chinese.
However, the ABM Treaty of 1972 and its 1974 Protocol put an end to
these plans. The treaty was welcomed in Western Europe for curtailing
American and, it was believed, Soviet BMD activities, thereby
butressing European security by ensuring the continued credibility of
the British and French deterrents; inhibiting the transfer of ABM tech-
nology to third countries; and assuring that the United States would be
just as vulnerable to ballistic missile attack as its allies. [Ref.
96:p. 146]
As the 1970s progressed and Soviet-American relations took on
an increasingly unfriendly tone, the ABM Treaty assumed special impor-
tance to the Europeans as the surviving "keystone" of detente. United
States interest in renegotiating the treaty therefore appears dangerous
and potentially destabilizing to many in Western Europe and still more
so the possibility of the treaty's abrogation [Ref. 96:p. 146]. Given
the fundamental European opposition to BMD, the question arises as to
whether some factions and governments in Europe might be persuaded that
qualified support of the SDI is in their interests.
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Subsequent to the SDI speech, the Reagan Administration has
made a vigorous effort to persuade the Europeans that SDI research ser-
ves their interests on political, economic, and strategic grounds.
Above all the Administration has sought to reassure the allies that the
SDI will remain in the research phase for several years, within which
time the United States intends to abide by the restrictions of the ABM
Treaty [Ref. 97]. Second, the United States is committed to con-
sultations with the allies up to the point where a decision to deploy
elements of the SDI is made [Ref. 7:p. 17] . Third, the Administration
has indicated a willingness to accelerate research in technologies
applicable to defense against shorter-range ballistic missiles [Ref.
1 9 : P • 10]. Finally, the Administration has attempted to convince the
allies that the SDI does not represent abandonment by the United States
of the arms control process, but that the program could help to restore
the efficacy of the process which has been undermined by Soviet activi-
ties [Ref. 9:p. 2].
SDI research has also been defended in terms of its potential
"spin-off" benefits. In the political area, the non-nuclear and
apparently defensive nature of the SDI could serve to co-opt the
European anti -nuclear movement. The Europeans also stand to gain
economically from the jobs and civilian applications of SDI technology
that would derive from participation in the research phase of the
program. Conversely, failure to participate could cause Europe to fall
further behind in the technology competition with the United States and
Japan. West European opportunities for influencing US decision making
in the program would also be greatly reduced. SDI research, moreover,
94
is likely to produce technical advances with cross-applications to
military programs of interest to NATO— for example, improved software
for automated command, control, communications, and intelligence in the
European theater
.
Generally speaking, while the Europeans remain dubious as to
the SDI's technical feasibility and strategic desirability, they seem
to be convinced that the United States is genuinely committed to pro-
ceeding with SDI research. As a consequence of this assessment, the
West Europeans prefer not to reject the SDI outright because of their
concern that the United States will forge ahead without European par-
ticipation. Additionally, a consensus seems to have developed on the
possible consequences to European security that could result from
failure to respond to advances in Soviet strategic defense. The
recognition of this threat even among governments that have expressed
opposition to the SDI, such as in France, suggests that this may be the
Reagan Administration's strongest case for the program.
A curious aspect of the President's March 1983 speech was the
omission of any reference to the magnitude of Soviet BMD research and
development efforts and to related civil defense and air defense
programs [Ref. 94 :p. 1133- Indeed, emphasis on the SDI as a necessary
response to Soviet strategic defense was, until 1985, a lesser theme in
the Administration's argument for the program. This apparent discre-
pancy has now been rectified, however, and Administration spokesmen
have come out strongly against what is perceived as a growing threat in
Soviet active and passive defense programs [Ref. 21].
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The Administration's threat rationale for the SDI seeks to
identify European security with the American view of Flexible Response.
First, to the extent that NATO's selective nuclear strike options
depend upon US ICBMs and shorter-range ballistic missiles such as
PERSHING and LANCE, Soviet BMD could erode the credibility of NATO
strategy. Second, Soviet control over the escalation process could be
enhanced if they were to gain a unilateral BMD advantage. In this
event, the USSR would possess a more clear-cut ability to try to
influence US nuclear employment decisions— i.e., to control escalation
by "deterring the US deterrent." Finally, Soviet defensive deployments
would be consistent with a strategy that prefers to gain hegemony
without war by leading Western Europe to accomodate Soviet goals poli-
tically in the face of superior Soviet war-waging potential. The
Soviet Union would thus be in a position to conduct strategic blackmail
with the ultimate goal of separating the United States from its allies.
[Ref. 98]
The Administration has sought to convince the allies that
expanded roles for BMD are probably inevitable, not because of the SDI,
but as a result of Soviet activities. The "initiative" element of the
SDI resides in its value for providing an incentive for the Soviets to
approach offensive and defensive arms control seriously. According to
this view, the United States would place international stability,
Western security interests, and arms contol at risk if it failed to
proceed with SDI research as a hedge against a potential break-out of
Soviet strategic defenses. [Ref. 9^:p. 128]
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Despite the partial success to date of US efforts to "sell" the
SDI to the allies, European anxieties that were evident during the late
1960s debate on BMD have not gone away. Though apparently cognizant of
the possible consequences of failing to respond to Soviet defense
activities, the Europeans continue to harbor legitimate reservations as
to the effect of the SDI on their long-term security interests.
The SDI appears destabilizing to many Europeans because of
their belief that the deployment of defenses would be more dangerous
than preserving mutual vulnerability. An arms race in BMD could lead
to illusions about the controlability of nuclear war in either or both
the United States and the Soviet Union, and to mutual fears of
preemptive attack. The arms race would be intensified by expanded
offensive forces and penetration aids to overwhelm defenses, as well as
by competition in defensive capabilities. [Ref. 94:p. 117]
The Europeans are naturally concerned about the implications of
the SDI for the future of East-West relations. Despite reassurances
from the Administration to the contrary, many Europeans see the SDI as
a threat to the ABM Treaty, which is regarded as a monument to detente
[Ref. 94 :p. 118]. The tendency of the Europeans to place top priority
on arms control as a barometer of their security has apparently not
been significantly affected by evidence of Soviet violations of arms
control accords—including the ABM Treaty.
The Europeans are further concerned over ultimate US intentions
for the SDI. Specifically, is the SDI intended for population defense
or protection of strategic weapons? In his March 1983 speech, the
President stated, and has continued to maintain, that the purpose of
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SDI research is to see if a system could be built to provide complete
protection of the United States and its allies against an attack with
ballistic missiles. But many see complete protection (particularly of
Europe) as technically infeasible and so fears of differing levels of
vulnerability, and hence strategic decoupling, are raised.
On the other hand, some officials in the United States have
indicated that point defenses of strategic missile sites might alone be
feasible. But this option calls into question the sincerity of US
intentions to eliminate or substantially reduce the level of strategic
arsenals, as opposed to providing a shield for modernized offensive
weapons. The latter alternative implies the intent to replace mutual
assured destruction not with mutual survival through defense, but with
a war-fighting doctrine that could well leave Western Europe
dangerously exposed. To repeat: from the European perspective, a
doctrine which contemplates a role for nuclear weapons on any other
basis than pure deterrence is to be avoided.
Closely related to such concerns is the fear that the SDI could
lead the United States to adopt a "fortress America" isolationist posi-
tion, and hence abandon Europe to Soviet domination. A less extreme
version of this view is that a Soviet-American agreement on strategic
defenses (formal or implicit) could lead to a new form of superpower
condominium with Western Europe clearly subordinated to the United
States by dependence on US technology [Ref. 94 :p. 121]. Yet another
variant of this line of reasoning is the potential detrimental effects
of the SDI on the independent deterrents of Britain and France. These
forces are held to be valuable because (among other reasons) they
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complicate Soviet attack plans thereby enhancing deterrence. The coun-
terargument to the SDI is that it would further stimulate Soviet
efforts to develop countermeasures; as a consequence, both the British
and French nuclear forces, being smaller than those of the United
States, would experience greater difficulty in penetrating an improved
Soviet defense [Ref. 95:p. 31 J.
The Europeans are ill-disposed to accept the financial burden
of yet another expensive weapon system. While the allies are anxious
to gain the benefits that might derive from lucrative SDI research
contracts, they are not anxious to bear a substnatial part of the costs
of an anti-tactical missile defense system for Western Europe [Ref.
95 :p« 33]. They are further worried over the probable opportunity
costs of the SDI to both the United States and Europe—i.e., less
resources would be available for improving conventional defenses.
Perhaps most frightening is the prospect that both the American
and Soviet versions of the SDI might work. Such a condition could make
the possibility of fighting a conventional war more likely and more
acceptable. The European view of deterrence through offensive means
continues to be that it has been successful in keeping the peace,
however imperfectly. The highly-destructive potential of nuclear
weapons is seen as an unpleasant reality, but one that has served for
decades as a successful deterrent to conflicts between the major
powers. Even if the SDI proves effective, no European wants to make
the world safe for conventional war. [Ref. 95 :p. 36]
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2 . Soviet Portrayal of the SDI's Impact on Europe
The Soviet campaign against the SDI was designed to reinforce
and exploit some of the existing European concerns outlined in the pre-
ceding discussion. The thrust of Soviet commentary was to portray the
SDI as being harmful to European interests as a result of ( 1 ) the
general consequences of the SDI following from increased
Soviet-American strategic competition; and (2) the unequal nature of
the SDI's costs and benefits as they might be viewed by the NATO
allies
.
a. Effects of Increased Superpower Competition
Soviet characterization of US political-military strategy
as agressive and militaristic is a perennial theme of Soviet propaganda
[Ref. 47]. As concerns Western Europe, the intent of such statements
is obviously to undermine support for the SDI by portraying the Soviet
Union as the injured party, while attempting to discredit the Reagan
Administration as being opposed to detente. While such a view would
readily be accepted by the pacifist minority, many European moderates
are also disturbed by what they see as a confrontationist orientation
in US policy toward the Soviet Union that places priority on the mili-
tary aspect of US-USSR relations.
The Europeans favor a more differentiated approach which
takes into account the military dimension, but which also sees the con-
tinuation of detente as being in the long-term interests of European
security [Ref. 99 :p. 53. Thus, while the Europeans "consider the
source" of Soviet accusations of US hegemony-seeking, they are nonethe-
less concerned by the latter' s emphasis on military solutions to the
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problem of European security, and the relative lack of emphasis on
other approaches for dealing with the Soviets, for example, through
trade and arms control
.
It was therefore not surprising when the Soviets accused
the United States of attempting to secure its strategic objectives by
resort to deception, disinformation (particularly with respect to the
"Soviet threat"), and by obstructing arms control. The deception theme
was usually couched in terms of its perpetration on the allies:
"Washington seeks to secure support for the 'star wars' program from
its allies, justify its policy of militarizing outer space in the
eyes of West Europeans, and remove or dull apprehensions mounting in
Western countries over this new step of the American leadership,
which is extremely dangerous to the cause of peace. By having
recourse to all manner of tricks and downright deception and keeping
silent on the true aims and unavoidable consequences of its plans to
militarize outer space, the US administration is out to mislead
public opinion and governments of West European
countries . . . .Washington ' s plan is offensive and aggressive and aims
to give the United States a military advantage. It is into this pur-
suit of the mirage of superiority, which is unattainable since the
Soviet Union will not allow it, that they now hope to drag Western
Europe." [Ref. 100 :p. AA8] (Emphasis added)
According to the Soviets, the SDI represented a deception
of intent with respect to its allegedly defensive nature, which was
deemed to be inconsistent with the overall militarisitic character of
US strategic objectives. The SDI was also a "capability deception" in
that the stated US goal of achieving a "totally effective" defense was
held to be technically infeasible. The Soviets also claimed that the
United States was exaggerating the Soviet threat in order to garner
public support for the SDI. This theme, along with accusations that
the United States was set on obstructing arms control, became more
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prominent as the focus of Soviet media attention shifted to Western
Europe
.
All of these themes were designed to undercut support for
the SDI by attacking the Administration's credibility. The arms
control theme was perhaps the most potent, given the priority which
Europeans place on this subject as a gauge of detente. The employment
of this theme appeared to peak with the Soviet proposal for a total ban
on "space weapons" and ASAT testing in early 1984, but has generally
been invoked in connection with the United States' refusal to negotiate
on SDI research
.
The Soviets generally condemned the SDI for its potentially
negative effect on "strategic stability" and specifically its implica-
tions for the ABM Treaty. As discussed earlier, both are sensitive
subjects to the West Europeans. The Soviets attempted to capitalize on
European concerns by including the military-related activities of the
space shuttle and ASAT testing as elements of the SDI. As such, the
United States was accused of already having breached the ABM Treaty.
The claimed consequences of the SDI were particularly per-
tinent to Europe (see Table 5). The logic of the Soviet position was
simple and straight forward: If the United States proceeded with the
SDI, the Soviet Union will be forced to adopt countermeasures which
will stimulate an arms race in all spheres. Thus, not only would SDI
mean the end of the arms control process , but the international
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It is noteworthy that as Soviet attention increasingly con-
centrated on Western Europe, their emphasis on the SDI's implications
for the arms control process appeared to increase even as the other
general consequences of the program received relatively less attention.
Again, this effect was probably due in part to Soviet efforts to
portray themselves as non-belligerent and the United States as
recklessly endangering arms control. It was also intended to propagan-
dize the recently resumed talks in Geneva.
Soviet references to military countermeasures to the SDI
were cast in terms of their being forced upon the USSR. Beyond this,
such statements were intended to undercut two key Reagan Administration
arguments for the program. First, the Soviets predictably came down on
that side of the feasibility debate which held that countermeasures to
the SDI would be infinitely cheaper to implement than the SDI itself
[Ref. 101]. Second, they indicated that the USSR would not be forced
into a transition to strategic defenses against its better interests,
thus countering the SDI's arms control rationale. Defense Minister
Sokolov:
"If the US starts the militarization of space and thereby undermines
the existing military-strategic equilibrium, the Soviet Union will be
left with no other choice but to take retaliatory measures to restore
its position. These could be measures in the field of defensive arms
or in that of offensive arms. Needless to say, the USSR will choose
modes of action that correspond best to the interests of its defense
capability, but not those that the people in Washington would like to
persuade it to pick ." [Ref. 59:p. 8] (Emphasis added)
Within days of the SDI's announcement, the Soviets assumed
the role of staunch defender of the ABM Treaty. Notwithstanding their
own activities in the area of strategic defense, the Soviets stressed
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offensive-defensive interaction as a controllable cause of the arms
race [Ref. 102]. As General Secretary Andropov's comments indicate, it
is this linkage that is threatened by the SDI
:
"When the USSR and the US first began to discuss the problem of stra-
tegic arms, they jointly recognized that there is an indissoluble
connection between strategic offensive arms and defensive
arms.... Now, however, the US has conceived the idea of severing this
connection. The practical result of this concept, should it be
realized, would be to open the floodgates to an unrestricted arms
race in all types of strategic weapons—both offensive and
defensive." [Ref. 51 :p. 5]
The party's position on the subject of future arms control
talks was laid down by General Secretary Andropov shortly after the
President's 23 March 1983 speech. Andropov argued to the effect that,
unless the SDI were abandoned, the entire process of strategic arms
limitation would be derailed [Ref. 103]. The same threat had been made
in Soviet propaganda against NATO's planned deployment of INF missiles
prior to the Soviet walkout of November 1983 [Ref. 58 :p. 32]. Their
return to the negotiating table in March 1985 has still not prevented
the Soviets from employing the threat of an arms control breakdown in
their campaign against the SDI.
Stimulating fear of increased tension or war has been a
standard major aspect of Soviet propaganda against NATO. This theme
was employed during 1983 both against the planned deployment of INF
missiles [Ref. 58:p. 26] and against the recently announced SDI
program. Andropov again:
"The adventurism and danger of this whole undertaking is that here
they put the emphasis on impunity, on delivering a first nuclear
strike while assuming that they can secure themselves against a reta-
liatory strike. From here, its not far to the temptation to reach
for the launch button . This is the chief danger of the new American
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military concept. It is capable only of bringing the world closer to
the nuclear abyss ." [Ref. 104] (Emphasis added)
As Table 5 indicates, the SDI's potential for increasing
the risk of war received relatively less play in Soviet commentary
following Gorbachev's assumption of power. This moderation in tone is
in keeping with Soviet efforts in 1985 to reinforce through persuasion
already-existing European reservations concerning the SDI.
b. The Unequal Nature of the SDI's Costs and Benefits
In their analysis of Soviet propaganda activities, Shultz
and Godson found that a significant amount of attention was devoted to
the topic of problems within the NATO alliance, and specifically, divi-
sions among the allies. Key factors contributing to these divisions,
according to the Soviets, include the interference of the United States
in West European politics, and American pressure on European govern-
ments to conform to Washington's preferences. [Ref. 47:p. 97]
A similar pattern was revealed in Soviet treatment of
United States and allied differences over the SDI. Soviet efforts to
aggravate disunity over this issue appeared to increase after Gorbachev
assumed leadership of the Communist Party. A causal relationship is
not necessarily indicated here because a trend in this direction had
been established during Chernenko's tenure. It was more likely a reac-
tion to increased US efforts to gain European support for, and par-
ticipation in, SDI research. Again, it probably also was part of the
Soviet program to influence European public opinion after the resump-
tion of arms control talks in Geneva in March 1985.
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A prominent theme employed by the Soviets was emphasis on
conflicts between United States and allied security interests. This
generally took the form of portraying the Americans as being concerned
primarily (or exclusively) for their own security, thereby placing
European interests in jeopardy:
"In postwar history, the relations of the West European countries
with the transatlantic superally (sic) have known quite a few sharp
differences and disputes but perhaps never before have they been so
broad and protracted as they are regarding the question of the 'star
wars' project. Maybe in London, Paris, Brussels, Rome, and Bonn they
do not always speak their minds fully—lest they irritate their
patron unnecessarily— but the ruling circles of those capitals surely
realize the grave consequences of their participation in Washington's
space madness . . . . It is the sovereignty, security, and maybe the very
existence of the West European countries that would eventually have
to be placed on the altar of the Reagan program, and many people in
Western Europe are well aware of this ." [Ref. 105] (Emphasis added)
Despite the implied threat in this passage, Soviet
attempts to exploit European concerns over the SDI were generally low-
key. The negative implications of the SDI for European security were
held to be the result of agressive actions by the United States which
would prompt a reluctant, and largely undefined, Soviet response. The
main threat to Europe, it was said, derived from US desires to limit
war to Europe; the SDI was an obvious manifestation of this aim:
"The acquisition by the United States of even minimum opportunites to
somewhat reduce the damage to its territory that would result from a
retaliatory nuclear blow could turn the heads of some people in
Washington, giving them a false sense of security and the false idea
of the acceptability and admissability of unleashing all manner of
•limited' wars far from America's shores, first of all in Europe."
[Ref 100]
Soviet references to US intentions for the SDI alleged that
the United States was attempting to force the program on Europe
(against the latter 's better interests), or to lure the West European
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governments with promises of economic and technological gain. The pur-
pose again was to highlight the unequal nature of US-European
relations"
"At the end of March, US Defense Secretary Weinberger sent the allies
a message which, in the form of an ultimatum, demanded that they say
within 60 days whether they will participate in research work on
the .. .Strategic Defense Initiative. The pressure caused considerable
shock on this side of the Atlantic ... .This is understandable: Who
wants to publicly acknowledge his status as Washington's 'vassal'?"
[Ref. 106]
"It must be pointed out that the unusual word ' Europessimism,
'
denoting the European community's marked lagging behind the United
States and especially Japan in the technological contest, has become
fashionable in Western Europe. The White House leaders are playing
on these feelings, attempting to entice Western Europe with the
opportunity to utilize their participation in (SDI) to obtain tech-
nological benefits." [Ref. 107]
On the issue of SDI technology transfer, the Soviets placed
considerable emphasis on US intentions to exploit Europe— i.e., by
draining its scientific talent and resources without providing any
substantial technical or scientific returns. The immense profits that
would undoubtedly result from SDI research would likewise remain in the
hands of the US military-industrial complex.
The security benefits of the SDI were also described as
devolving mainly to the United States. This would be a function not
only of US desires to protect itself at Europe's expense, but of the
inability of the SDI to provide defense against missiles targeted on
Western Europe. Thus, the technical infeasibility and decoupling the-
mes were combined:
"The United States suggests the creation of a 'three-tier' ABM system
for the protection of its territory ... .It is believed that even such
an intricate system is incapable of ensuring 100 percent interception
of missiles that have the flight time of 15 to 20 minutes to the USA.
The flight time to targets in Europe for medium-range missiles is
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only 8-10 minutes. The liklihood of interception will be very
slight ... .This means that trying to hide behind three fences
,
Washington in advance leaves Western Europe to a semblance of
defense ." [Ref. 108] (Emphasis added)
Not surprisingly, the theme of general European opposition
to the SDI seemed to increase as some of the allied governments
expressed qualified support for SDI research. The alleged reason for
opposition, again, lay in the fear of the SDI's consequences for
European security:
"Representatives of the West European countries, speaking at the
spring session of the military policy-making bodies of NATO in
Brussels do not conceal fears that the development of a US space-
based antiballistic missile defense will seriously destabilize the
military and political situation in the world and erode the foun-
dation of the current Soviet-US negotiations in Geneva on preventing
an arms race in space and terminating it on earth ...
.
They note that
Washington is still striving for a situation whereby it would be
Europeans, first and foremost, who would have to pay for the con -
sequences of a destabilization of the situation in the
world . . . .Despite strong pressure exerted by Washington, not a single
West European NATO country has thus far announced officially its con-
sent to participate in the American plans for outer space
militarization." [Ref. 109] (Emphasis added)
A government or individual that indicated even qualified
support for the SDI was labeled an "accomplice" by the Soviets . The
governments and leadership of Great Britain and the Federal Republic of
Germany were particularly criticized, with the FRG receiving the
harshest attacks. When referring to the West Germans, Soviet propa-
ganda occasionally attempted to isolate the government from the people
and other alliance members with claims of militarism and revanchism on
the part of the Kohl Administration:
"The results of public opinion polls attest that the majority of FRG
citizens oppose the 'star wars' program. However, certain circles in
the FRG pin their own revanchist aspirations and plans on the space
militarization plans ... .French President Mitterrand attributed the
FRG's 'temptation to participate' in the US program to Bonn's desire
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to 'circumvent the bans resulting from the last world war . ' The FRG
military-industrial complex would like not only to negate the factor
of French and British possession of nuclear weapons, but also to gain
access to still more sophisticated military technology." [Ref. 1 1 : p
.
AA7] (Emphasis added)
In their presentation of the consequences to Europe from
the SDI, the Soviets made general references to "decreased European
security." Such an outcome would be the result of a renewed arms race,
increased international instability, and so forth, rather than as a
result of specific Soviet actions per se . This approach was consistent
with the line that portrayed the USSR as an innocent victim of US mili-
tarism. The Soviets thus adopted a reasonable tone toward the West
Europeans, urging them to adhere to arms control and a policy of
detente as the best means of insuring their security:
"Sober-minded politicians and military experts in Western
Europe... are well aware of the dangers connected with these programs.
They stress that the United States' space plans lead to a new spiral
in the arms race, not only in space but also on earth, to the
lessening of strategic stability, to the enhancement of the threat of
nuclear war. The only alternative to this dangerous road is the
working out of effective agreements aimed at prevention of the arms
race in space and its termination on earth, at limiting and reducing
nuclear arms ." [Ref. 108:p. AA1 ] (Emphasis added)
"In its line to quell the anxiety of the West European partners the
US leadership banks on the application of its policy of confrontation
against the USSR and other socialist countries. This stake on the
confrontationist goals of Reaganism as a sort of whip in relations
with US partners can be traced with increasing clarity to the 'star
wars' concept itself, which is the next pretext for undermining an
expansion of economic, scientific, and technological ties between
Western Europe and the socialist countries. This stake goes so far
as to make the West European partners of the United States forget
about any alternative. Yet, the alternative does exist and nothing
has cancelled out the beneficial experience of this realization
during the period of eased tension ." [Ref. 111] (Emphasis added)
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3 . Interpreting the Soviet Response: The SDI as an Opportunity
The Soviet campaign against the SDI was intended to exploit
existing concerns over the program's implications for Western Europe's
long-term security and economic position vis-a-vis the United States.
As in their anti-INF campaign, the Soviets sought to dramatize per-
ceived differences of interest between the United States, on the one
hand, and on the other, those existing between the major West European
countries and their respective political parties. The resulting
polarization of opinion could be seen as furthering the achievement by
the Soviet Union of its broad political objectives in Europe, which
include:
- Undermining the military and political cohesion of the Western
alliance;
- Decoupling the United States from Western Europe, preferably by
means of American and European self-isolation;
- Neutralizing Western Europe politically, not through
"Finlandization ," but within the framework of a European system of
peaceful coexistence,"; and
- Establishing the Soviet Union as the dominant political factor in
all of Europe, without necessarily incorporating Western Europe
into the Soviet bloc. [Ref. 112]
As in their campaign to forestall INF deployment, the Soviets
pursued a twofold strategy to erode European support for the SDI.
First, an attempt was made to drive a wedge between the United States
and its NATO partners: the SDI was presented as a program that served
Washington's militaristic purposes while endangering the interests of
the Europeans. Second, the Soviets portrayed themselves as willing to
compromise and reach a negotiated solution to the problem, while
simultaneously threatening dire consequences if a solution was not
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obtained. The intent of this strategy was to draw attention to the
condition of "unequal risk" existing between the United States and
Europe which would be further aggravated by the SDI. Additionally, the
Soviets sought to reinforce the perception of "unequal benefits"
derived from continuing US economic and technological dominance. Both
aspects were reflected to a greater or lesser degree in the intra-
alliance and European national debates over the SDI.
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the debate broke down along
party lines, with the ruling CDU/CSU coalition of Chancellor Kohl
favoring SDI research and the opposition SPD (Social Democrats)
opposed. Kohl defended SDI research as "justified, politically
necessary, and serving the security interests of the West as a whole"
[Ref. 1 1 3 : P • J2]. While acknowledging the research program as a
necessary hedge against Soviet military activities, the Germans based
their support of the SDI on political and economic grounds. Since the
United States was likely to proceed with the research phase of the SDI
in any case, German opposition could only serve to weaken NATO soli-
darity. Abstention, moreover, would restrict German influence over US
development, deployment, and strategy decisions. Finally, German non-
participation would mean forfeiture of the SDI's technological
"spin-off" benefits and the probable widening of the American and
Japanese lead in high-technology, which threatened the FRG's future
economic position.
Conditions imposed by the West German government on its support
for SDI research, however, tended to reflect Bonn's concerns over the
program's potential for providing "unequal risks" and "unequal
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benefits." In the area of security, it was stated that Europe must not
be decoupled from the United States; Flexible Response must remain
valid as a war prevention strategy (versus a war-fighting
strategy—Author); and transitional instabilities must be avoided [Ref.
114]. Furthermore, SDI research should be conducted with a view toward
preventing an arms race in space while contributing to the reduction of
offensive weapons in arms control negotiations [Ref. 115]. Finally,
German participation was predicated on full access to the technical and
economic benefits of SDI research [Ref. 116].
These "reservations" on the part of the government were cited
by SPD spokesman as precisely the reasons why West Germany should not
participate in the SDI. In most respects, the arguments put forth by
the SPD reflected the Soviet view, at least in terms of the SDI's con-
sequences for Western Europe. This was probably a manifestation of the
Soviet tendency to encourage views which favor their own position.
Nevertheless, there was a remarkable similarity between the perceptions
of the Social Democrats and the image of the SDI projected by Soviet
propagandists
.
In contrast to the government's position, SPD spokesmen did not
acknowledge the threat rationale for the SDI. In fact, Soviet activi-
ties in strategic defense or other military areas was seldom mentioned.
Rather, it was the SDI that presented the real threat to West German
security.
The SPD appeared to share the government's concern that the
SDI threatened to weaken Flexible Response as primarily a deterrent, or
war-prevention, strategy. But the argument that the SDI could ever
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foster a transition to pure or even predominant defense was dismissed.
The SPD's view that the SDI would instead mix offensive with defensive
weapons [Ref. 113:p. J6] aligned with the Soviet contention that the
program was actually intended to reinforce the war-fighting aspect of
US-NATO strategy. By extension, the SPD also indirectly supported
Soviet claims of deceptive intent behind the SDI.
Finally, even if the SDI was only partially effective, the SPD
was concerned that Europe might not come under its shield. Therefore,
a real danger existed of Europe being strategically split away from the
United States [Ref. 1 1 7 :p . J3].
Chancellor Kohl's argument that FRG participation in SDI
research would enhance German influence over US decision making was
rejected by SPD spokesman as "wishful thinking" [Ref. 1 1 8
:
p . J4 ] . The
SPD maintained, moreover, that it was an illusion to assume that the
West Europeans could participate in the SDI's research phase without
having to jointly bear the military responsibility, the consequences,
and the burdens of eventual deployment [Ref. 1191. This was, of
course, exactly the case being made by the Soviets.
The SPD's position on the SDI's implications for arms control
reflected the concerns contained in the government's conditions for
support of the SDI, but flatly contradicted Kohl's argument that the
program could contribute to the FRG's long-term security in this area.
Rather, the SPD shared the Soviet view that the SDI would prompt the
latter 's adoption of countermeasures , thereby stepping up the arms race
and promoting instability [Ref. 1 1 7 : p . J2]. Consequently, the SPD
supported the Soviet proposal for a treaty banning all space weapons
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and a moratorium on space armaments at the start of the Geneva
negotiations [Ref. 120].
In short, the "unequal security" aspect of the Soviet campaign
against the SDI found a receptive audience in the West German Social
Democratic Party as well as among less moderate elements of the German
left. As indicated above, however, the governing coalition shared some
of the opposition's concerns but concluded that the risks of the SDI
could be minimized, if not altogether avoided, by German participation
in the program. In addition, it was felt that the German economy stood
to gain by active participation in SDI research. Yet SPD opposition to
the SDI on economic grounds tended to coincide with the "unequal
benefits" thrust of Soviet anti-SDI propaganda.
The SPD maintained that, given the US record on technology
transfer within NATO, the government's hopes for economic benefits
derived from SDI research were unfounded. First, it was pointed out
that for years the transfer of technology from the United States to
Europe was hampered for "security reasons"—i.e., out of fear that it
would end up in Soviet hands [Ref. 1 1 8
:
p . J4]. Second, it was
unlikely that the United States would be willing to jeopardize its
competitive position by relinquishing control of this technology in any
significant way. Third, there was the possibility of conflict with
provisions of the ABM Treaty which explicitly prohibited technology
transfer in this field [Ref. 121].
For these reasons, it was considered highly risky to base the
technological future of West Germany on the assumption of an unhindered
flow of information and knowledge from the United States. Instead, the
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SPD believed that the FRG ought to participate in joint West European
initiatives for technological and economic self-assertion [Ref. 122].
This naturally led to support for the European Research and
Coordination Agency (EUREKA) sponsored by France.
As with the West German government's support for SDI research,
French opposition to the program was grounded in a combination of
security, political, and economic considerations. First, there was the
question of the SDI's impact on the French independent nuclear
forces. The socialist government of President Mitterrand largely
shares the American view of the Soviet military threat to Europe [Ref.
123.*P- 228]. Thus, at least in some quarters, there was an
inclination to agree with the Reagan Administration's threat rationale
for the SDI. The prevailing opinion, however, was that the SDI would
stimulate further Soviet offensive and defensive deployments, and
thereby significantly undercut the credibility of the French deterrent.
So the SDI was seen as being not only militarily disadvantageous but,
to the extent that French nuclear forces ensure the country's
independence, politically disadvantageous as well [Ref. 124].
Furthermore, French calls for a coordinated European response
to the SDI reflected concern for the program's potentially negative
effect on their promotion of increased European defense cooperation,
particularly between France and West Germany [Ref. 125].
Finally, the French socialists, perhaps more than their West
German counterparts, saw the SDI as representing more of an economic
threat than an opportunity. In fact, the French Socialist Party, and
Mitterrand personally, apparently consider the Soviet military threat
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to be of secondary importance to the threat posed by American "economic
imperialism" [Ref. 1 2 3 : P . 2291.
Soviet claims of US intent to exploit Western Europe
economically and technologically were designed to fuel European
anxieties that the SDI could make them still more dependent on the
United States. Specifically, the Soviets sought to create the
impression that the United States was bent on fleecing its allies,
taking the best they have in science and technology but giving them
nothing of its own [Ref. 126]. Such fears were apparent in
Mitterrand's objection to the SDI because of the risk of a "brain
drain" to the United States and the prospect of Europe's being reduced
to playing the role of a "subcontractor" in the research program.
Another reason for French opposition to the SDI, according to
Mitterrand, was because Paris did not want to see itself involved in a
system "in which it would not be on an equal footing" with Washington
[Ref. 127]. Thus, Mitterrand revived the old debate between
"Gaullists" and "Atlanticists ," with France attempting to nudge the
West Germans away from the latter position by offering EUREKA as
another option if not an alternative to the SDI [Ref. 128].
In the French view, the economic challenge presented by the SDI
could not be met by dealing with the United States on a bilateral
basis. It was argued that the Europeans had no chance of resisting
this effort without a concerted and coordinated response [Ref. 129].
EUREKA could provide the focus for such a response. While EUREKA would
investigate much the same technological spheres as the SDI, its
principal advantage was said to be that it offers a broader field of
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applications, particularly for civilian uses. In contrast, the SDI was
criticized as being predominantly a military program whose civilian
spin-offs would not necessarily be substantial [Ref. 130],
Additionally, EUREKA'S civilian-orientation under European control
would not be as likely to arouse "destabilization" anxieties as had the
SDI.
The viability of EUREKA depended upon active West German
participation. When this was not forthcoming, Franco-German relations
could not help but be affected. Mitterrand saw Bonn's attraction to
the SDI as "filling a void" created by the denial of an indigenous
strategic nuclear deterrent to the FRG [Ref. 131]. While Mitterrand
was technically correct in his assessment of the Federal Republic's
continuing dependence on the US deterrent, this statement served only
to provide the Soviet Union with another propaganda theme: Bonn's
desire to "circumvent the bans resulting from the last world war" [Ref.
110:p. AA7].
As the SDI and EUREKA are not, in fact, complementary, the Kohl
government apparently perceived that resource constraints precluded
full German participation in both programs. On the other hand, the
interests of continued good relations with France, and Kohl's domestic
political position, made some form of German participation in EUREKA
inevitable. But as West German security ultimately depended upon the
United States—as the French president obliquely pointed out—Kohl
continued to voice his support for the SDI while applauding "in
principle" the goals of EUREKA. Thus, while encouraging intensified
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European cooperation, Kohl asserted that on the SDI "there can be no
question of forming a front against the United States" [Ref. 132],
The British position on the SDI reflected elements of those of
both the French and the West Germans. The British, like the French,
have to be concerned with the SDI's influence on Soviet strategic
weapons developments and the resulting effect on their independent
nuclear forces. But Prime Minister Thatcher, perhaps more than her
counterparts on the continent, appeared inclined to accept the American
view that Soviet BMD research had disturbed the strategic balance, and
that the SDI was a cautious and necessary response to Soviet activities
in this area [Ref. 1 33 H • In any case, verification problems precluded
reaching an agreement to prohibit or control research, and the ABM
Treaty already covered testing and deployment [Ref. 134]. In
Thatcher's view, as long as the Soviets abided by the provisions of
the ABM treaty, they had nothing to fear from a breach of that accord
by the United States.
The British also had an obvious interest in the economic
aspects of the SDI, and in avoiding any negative consequences that
might derive from their participation in the research phase of the
program. Here again they appeared to accept Reagan Administration
assurances that the SDI would not result in a technological "one-way
street." If they had any such qualms, they were seldom vocalized.
While the British admit the possibility of a "brain drain," they did
not feel this was reason enough for refusing to participate in SDI
research [Ref. 135].
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British ambivalence on this subject was reflected in their
agreement to participate in EUREKA in the hopes of encouraging greater
European technological cooperation, even while regarding the program as
being quite likely a duplication of effort [Ref. 133]. As with Kohl,
Thatcher was probably motivated at least in part by domestic and
alliance political considerations.
Britain's support for SDI research, like West Germany's,
carried a number of "conditions" which were part of a December 1984
agreement between Prime Minister Thatcher and President Reagan:
- SDI-related deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, have
to be a matter for negotiation;
- The overall aim is to enhance, and not to undermine, deterrence;
- East-West negotiation should aim to achieve security with reduced
levels of offensive weapons on both sides; and
- The United States' and Western aim is not to achieve superiority,
but to maintain balance, taking account of Soviet developments
[Ref. 136].
The British position on the SDI thus paralleled that of the
West Germans and of the French on certain key issues. First, all three
powers sought to maintain the emphasis on deterrence and war prevention
as the primary rationale for NATO's strategy of Flexible Response.
Second, the Europeans viewed progress in arms control as equally
important to, and inseparable from, the maintenance of military
equilibrium. A consensus exists that the object of the Geneva
negotiations should be to work out effective agreements aimed at
preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at
limiting and reducing strategic arms, and at strengthening strategic
stability. Finally, the European powers expressed varying degrees of
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concern over the SDI's potential impact on their future economic
positions vis-a-vis the United States.
Soviet commentary on these issues provides clear indications of
a concerted effort to convince the West Europeans that support for SDI
research was neither in their security nor economic interests. From
the Soviet perspective, the SDI presented another opportunity for
widening existing cleavages within NATO.
C. SUMMARY
The Soviet response to the SDI during the period March 1983 through
November 1 985 was aimed at undermining political support for the
program within the United States and in NATO Europe. The positions
assumed by Soviet leaders and other commentators were heavily weighted
toward maximizing the propaganda effects of their statements. However,
analysis of these statements provided indications of actual Soviet
perceptions of the SDI. In the Soviet-American context, which
dominated Soviet media attention prior to 1985, indications of the
Soviet view of the SDI as a threat were revealed. Subsequently, the
Soviet view of the SDI as an opportunity to widen the political rift
between the United States and Western Europe appeared to receive
relatively greater emphasis.
The hypothesis of the Soviet view of deception was supported in
their commentary relating to the SDI as a threat. In the Soviet view,
deception is a function of both capability and intent. Capability
deception was indicated by the nature of the SDI's probable technical
limitations. With occasional references to Western "experts," the
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Soviets argued that the SDI's ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear
weapons was technically unachievable. For the Reagan Administration to
maintain otherwise was considered a misrepresentation of reality for
the purpose of generating political support for the program. The
Soviet conceded, however, that some form of limited defense was
feasible and militarily useful, and found support for this contention
among statements by sources in the United States both within and
outside of government. The Soviets cast the capability deception
largely in terms of its perpetration on Western public opinion.
Deception of intent was expressed in terms of Western opinion and
as an attempt to deceive the Soviets themselves. According to Soviet
spokesmen, the true aim of the SDI was to enhance the credibility of
existing US strategic doctrine, which presumes the continued existence
of large quantities of nuclear weapons, rather than creating the
conditions for movement to a new strategy, which envisions the
elimination or at least large-scale reduction of these weapons.
Support for this view was found in the Soviet assessment of trends in
US strategic doctrine and weapons development oriented toward
maximizing the military effectiveness of nuclear weapons thereby
restoring some measure of their political utility. As seen by the
Soviets, limited defenses could play a useful role in such a strategy,
as indeed they do in Soviet strategic doctrine.
The Soviets dismissed as a ploy the scenario which foresees the
sacrifice of the bulk of Soviet deterrent forces as a necessary
precondition for the mutual transition to reliance on strategic
defenses. It would be highly uncharacteristic of the Soviet leadership
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to so place its security in the hands of a hostile power. In their
commentary, the Soviets sought to remove all doubt that they considered
the SDI as essentially motivated by hostile intent and seemed convinced
that such a reaction must have been anticipated in the United States.
The Soviets seemed ambivalent about the actual military utility of
the SDI in a limited defense role. Their assertions concerning US
intent to achieve strategic superiority partly by means of the SDI were
balanced by an apparent confidence that the system could be overcome by
a variety of countermeaures , however expensive such countermeasures
might be. Still, both party and military commentators appeared deeply
disturbed by the SDI's potential role of countering a ragged Soviet
retaliation following a first strike by the United States.
As much, if not more, disquieting was the SDI's potential effect on
the accomplishment of certain Soviet foreign policy objectives. Though
less forthcoming on thi3 subject, the Soviet leadership is undoubtedly
aware of the political benefits that the appearance of military
superiority has provided, particularly with respect to Western Europe.
To the extent that the SDI contributes to the reinforcement of US
strategic posture, the political leverage of Soviet posture is
proportionately reduced. It is out of such concern that Soviet
accusations of US hegemony-seeking arise. More likely, the Soviets
viewed the SDI as a measure that could provide the United States with a
marginal military advantage, but considerable political advantage in
the on-going Soviet-American strategic competition.
Soviet commentary on the SDI in the context of Western Europe was
obviously aimed at exploiting the political discord within NATO, which
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had intensified with US efforts to enlist European support for the
research phase of the program. As in their earlier campaigns against
improvements in NATO defenses, the Soviets sought to highlight existing
divergences of interest between the United States and the allies, and
to reinforce European concerns over the SDI's potential for
contributing to a condition of "unequal security" and "unequal
benefits." Such concerns were shared not only among political elements
opposed to the SDI but, to a considerable degree, among those
governments that expressed qualified support for the SDI as well.
In the security realm, European interests include maintaining
equilibrium between the opposing military alliances while reducing
international tension and instability through arms control. The
Soviets attempted to erode support for the SDI by demonstrating that
the program served neither aspect of European security. The SDI was
portrayed as part of bid for military superiority which could disrupt
the "existing strategic equilibrium" and would lead to an intensified
arms race in all spheres.
Soviet emphasis on the SDI's "war-fighting" qualities was intended
to raise European fears of "limited nuclear war," the consequences of
which would be felt mainly in Western Europe. At the same time, the
Soviets stressed that the SDI in a partial defense role would limit
damage to the United States while providing little or no coverage of
Europe, thus stimulating anxiety over strategic decoupling.
Countermeasures which the USSR would be "forced" to adopt in
response to the SDI would probably be even more effective against the
small nuclear deterrent forces of Britain and France. The Europeans
124
would then be left with the worst of both worlds: the SDI could
increase confidence in the United States in lowering the nuclear
threshold without adequately protecting the allies, while the deterrent
effect of the latters* strategic forces became less and less credible.
The Soviets also sought to exacerbate widely-held fears that the
SDI could further strengthen America's technological and economic
positions vis-a-vis Western Europe. Rather than promoting European
competitiveness, the United States was accused of attempting to exploit
the allies through their participation in SDI research. A similar
argument against participation was advanced by the European left,
particularly the West German Social Democratic Party and the socialist
government of France. However, reservations on this issue were also
expressed by officials in the German Federal government and, to a
lesser extent, the British government.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Soviet response to the Strategic Defense Initiative has
provided some indications of their view of the program as a threat to
their security and as an opportunity to weaken NATO. This view has
been conditioned by a strategic culture that mandates the appearance,
if not substance in all respects, of overwhelming military power, at
once to deter attacks and to intimidate hostile powers and coalitions.
The Soviets fear the SDI not only because of the potential physical
threat to the Soviet Union, but also because it could undermine the
military basis of their strategy that seeks above all to politically
separate Western Europe from the United States. This strategy has been
successful to the extent that confidence in the American security
guarantee has been reduced on both sides of the Atlantic. The Soviets
therefore see the SDI as a means by which the US strategic nuclear
contribution to European defense may be insured indefinitely rather
than as a measure designed to permit the mutual transition to wholly or
predominantly defensive postures.
Reagan Administration assertions on the latter are seen as an
attempt at deception on technical grounds and because its accomplish-
ment would serve neither American nor Soviet interests. For one thing,
progress made toward the elimination of nuclear weapons would still
leave intact Soviet conventional superiority in Europe. Secondly, the
United States cannot realistically expect the Soviet Union to sacrifice
the level of security achieved through years of strenuous effort. In
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any case, the Soviets reject the idea that a political accomodation
between the superpowers can be attained through military pressure and
seem convinced that the Americans must be aware of this. It is the
fact that this view is widely held in Western Europe that presents the
most promising opportunity for the Soviets to counter the SDI and
weaken NATO simultaneously.
Rather than bolstering alliance solidarity, the SDI has had a divi-
sive effect on NATO. The program has tended to highlight differing
views between Western Europe and the United States on the definition of
security and the best means of attaining it, while aggravating European
fears of American economic and technological dominance. The old debate
has been revived over continuing West German and general European
dependence on the US security guarantee and French efforts to lessen
that dependence. In West Germany, the political discord generated by
the SDI threatens to polarize society in a manner similar to that which
occurred during the INF modernization debate.
Paradoxically, US efforts to improve the military defense of
Western Europe, as well as of the United States, once again have caused
the allies to wonder whether their long-term security interests are in
fact being served. It is just such concern that the Soviets have
sought to aggravate in their response to the SDI.
How the Soviets will respond to the SDI in the future remains, of
course, an open question. One option is to submit to compellant
pressure in the arms control arena as some in the West have already
claimed to see indications of. Another is to continue their political-
military program as they have in the past, or perhaps to accelerate
127
certain aspects of it, and so run the risk of realizing their worst
fears from the SDI "deception." Whichever path is chosen, the Soviets
have little to lose and a great deal to gain by continuing to encourage
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